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REGULATING IMPARTIALITY IN AGENCY
ADJUDICATION
KENT BARNETT†
ABSTRACT
Which should prevail—the Take Care Clause of Article II or the
Due Process Clause? To Justice Breyer’s chagrin, the majorities in
Lucia v. SEC and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB expressly declined
to resolve whether the U.S. Constitution condones SEC administrative
law judges’ and other similarly situated agency adjudicators’ current
statutory protection from at-will removal. The crux of the problem is
that, on one hand, senior officials may use at-will removal to pressure
agency adjudicators and thereby potentially imperil the impartiality
that due process requires. On the other hand, Article II limits
Congress’s ability to cocoon executive officers, including potentially
agency adjudicators, from at-will removal.
This Article argues that the executive branch itself can and should
moot or mitigate this constitutional clash. Nothing in Article II prevents
the president from issuing executive orders and agencies from
promulgating regulations—collectively, what I refer to as “impartiality
regulations”—that require good cause for disciplining and removing
agency adjudicators, as well as other means of protecting adjudicator
impartiality. Indeed, the executive branch has a long-standing yet
overlooked practice of using executive orders and regulations for
similar purposes. Impartiality regulations are but one form of the
executive branch’s internal separation of powers. Such self-imposed
separation provides a strong theoretical and practical solution for the
agency-adjudicator dilemma.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has diligently ignored answering a problem of
its own making: Is the current statutory insulation that federal
administrative adjudicators have from at-will removal constitutional?
The answer proves elusive because it requires untangling the Court’s
interpretations of at least two competing constitutional provisions—
the Due Process and Take Care Clauses.1

1. Because the Supreme Court has also indicated that a federal official’s status as an officer
or employee may affect how much oversight the president must have over that official, the
Appointments Clause may add another constitutional provision into the mix. See Free Enter.
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The problem arose in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board2 in 2010.3 In that decision, the Court
considered whether Congress could cocoon members of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) within two levels
of protection from at-will removal. One level directly protected the
PCAOB members from at-will removal by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), while a second level protected the SEC
commissioners from the president’s at-will removal.4 The Court held
that dual for-cause provisions impermissibly limited the president’s
oversight of administrative officials.5 The dissenting Justices noted
that, among numerous other examples within the federal bureaucracy,
the federal government’s now nearly two thousand “administrative law
judges” (“ALJs”)6 enjoyed dual-cause protection, and the dissenters
suggested that ALJs’ protection would be unconstitutional under the
majority’s holding.7 The majority suggested in response that ALJs’ dual
for-cause insulation may be constitutional because of their status as
employees—not “inferior officers” of the United States—or
adjudicators.8
Yet only eight years later in Lucia v. SEC,9 the Court held that the
SEC’s ALJs were indeed “inferior officers” because of their trialjudge-like powers.10 Despite appearing to bring ALJs’ insulation within
the reach of Free Enterprise Fund, the Court again punted on the
constitutionality of ALJs’ insulation,11 over Justice Breyer’s and the
government’s objections.12 Lucia’s holding that ALJs are officers of the
United States does more than set aside a possible justification for
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010) (noting that
administrative law judges’ status as “Officers of the United States” is disputed, and thus they may
be able to have dual for-cause provisions to protect them from at-will removal if they are merely
employees).
2. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
3. Id. at 483–84.
4. See id. at 486–87 (describing express and implicit removal provisions).
5. Id. at 484–98.
6. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT, ALJS BY AGENCY, https://www.opm.gov/services-foragencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency [https://perma.cc/3B6C-95AC] (listing
1,931 ALJs as of March 2017).
7. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 542–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion).
9. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
10. See id. at 2053–54 (2018) (explaining why the SEC ALJs were “inferior officers” under
the Court’s earlier decision in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)).
11. Id. at 2050 n.1.
12. Id. at 2060–62 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ALJs’ insulation. It also calls into question the constitutionality of at
least some of the significantly more numerous, yet often forgotten,
cadre of non-ALJ adjudicators that perform ALJ-like functions and
have similar double insulation from at-will removal.13 These non-ALJ
adjudicators include immigration judges, administrative judges, and
other adjudicators with various titles.
Why has the Court been so hesitant to address agency
adjudicators’ dual for-cause protection from at-will removal? The
answer likely lies in the tension between two constitutional
provisions.14 After Free Enterprise Fund, the first provision—the Take
Care Clause—limits all or certain inferior officers to only one level of
“good cause” protection from removal or discipline between them and
the president in the executive-branch hierarchy.15 Two or even three
layers of “good cause” protection insulate ALJs: one for them, one for
the independent agency that reviews their removals, and sometimes
one for the head of the ALJs’ employing department.16 ALJs’
insulation thus appears to offend Article II.
Direct at-will removal of ALJs, however, likely undermines ALJs’
objective appearance of impartiality because department heads can
hold the subtle threat of discipline or removal over ALJs to encourage
them to favor agency positions.17 Another constitutional provision—
the Due Process Clause—requires impartiality for agency
adjudication,18 but whether impartiality entails protection from at-will
removal is less clear. In short, Congress may be damned if it insulates
agency adjudicators and damned if it does not.

13. See generally Kent Barnett, Some Kind of Hearing Officer, 94 WASH. L. REV. 515 (2019)
[hereinafter Barnett, Some Kind of Hearing Officer] (discussing the functions of non-ALJ
adjudicators and their reported numbers).
14. See generally Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797 (2013)
[hereinafter Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary] (referring to the tension over insulating ALJs
from at-will removal between Free Enterprise Fund and Lucia as the “ALJ quandary”).
15. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 496–97 (2010) (invalidating the second of
two good-cause statutory protections for PCAOB members to ensure sufficient presidential
oversight under the Take Care Clause).
16. See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 14, at 807 (“Agencies may remove
and generally discipline ALJs only for ‘good cause established and determined by the Merit
Systems Protection Board’ [(“MSPB”)] after a formal administrative hearing. The MSPB
members, like ALJs, also enjoy tenure protection because the President can remove them ‘only
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018))).
17. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493 (“[O]ne who holds his office only during the
pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against
the latter’s will.” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935))).
18. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).





2020]





  

 

REGULATING IMPARTIALITY

  

1699

Scholars and regulated parties have taken note. Two prominent
scholars, for instance, have recently called for doctrinal modification in
light of the collision between the two provisions.19 Regulated parties
have also challenged ALJs’ insulation. Although early district court
challenges proved unsuccessful,20 the Fifth Circuit recently considered
the issue so significant that it took the extraordinary step of enjoining
an adjudication before an SEC ALJ until after the court had resolved
the constitutionality of the ALJ’s protection from at-will removal.21
Solutions to this problem may prove difficult. On the one hand,
striking down agency adjudicators’ immediate statutory protection
from at-will removal will only undermine their appearance of
impartiality because the supervising official can now remove
adjudicators at will. On the other hand, removing the second layer of
“good cause” protection shielding adjudicators’ heads of department
or the agency that reviews adverse action against adjudicators would
be a significantly disruptive remedy. Such action might undermine
independent regulatory agencies altogether22 or subvert the entire civil
service model that has been in place for more than four decades.23
A more functional approach to the president’s removal power
could account for due process concerns in the context of agency
adjudication and thereby permit adjudicators’ protection from at-will
removal.24 But the Supreme Court has taken a formalist approach to

19. See generally, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, “You’re Fired!” Why the ALJ Multi-Track Dual
Removal Provisions Violate the Constitution and Possible Fixes, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 705
(2019) (calling for, among other things, a more wholesale overruling of the Court’s removal-power
jurisprudence); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Court Should Change the Scope of the Removal Power
by Adopting a Pure Functional Approach, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657 (2019).
20. See infra note 83 for a list of challenges to ALJs’ insulation from at-will removal.
21. Cochran v. SEC, No. 19-10396 (5th Cir. Sept. 25, 2019) (order granting preliminary
injunction); see also Peter Rasmussen, Analysis: Lack of Removal Power Could Threaten SEC
ALJ
Regime,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Oct.
7,
2019,
6:48
AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-lack-of-removal-power-couldthreaten-sec-alj-regime [https://perma.cc/5XRL-CL59] (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s injunction
and its implications).
22. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 502 (discussing precedent concerning good-cause
provisions).
23. See Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service
Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 961 (1976) (noting that by the Nixon administration, “[t]he
right of every civil servant to an outside appraisal of the grounds for dismissal has thus recently
replaced the historic emphasis on executive discretion”).
24. See generally Pierce, supra note 19 (calling for courts to adopt a functional approach
when defining the scope of the removal power).
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their recent removal-power jurisprudence.25 Other solutions—such as
permitting the D.C. Circuit to appoint agency adjudicators as an
interbranch appointment—may prove politically infeasible.26
This Article proposes an executive-branch solution that avoids
constitutional fisticuffs between competing provisions, as well as
complicated legislative responses. Namely, the White House and
agencies should use executive orders and regulations to mimic and
improve administrative adjudicators’ existing statutory protections
from at-will removal. I refer to these orders and regulations collectively
as “impartiality regulations.”
These regulations are one example of what scholars term “internal
separation of powers”: internal executive-branch action that furthers
other constitutional or policy objectives.27 The key benefits of internal
separation of powers, like those proposed here, are that they permit
the executive to fashion separation in useful ways that address specific,
nuanced problems—such as the impartiality of adjudicators within the
omnibus civil service—without offending the constitutional separation
of powers among the branches. To be sure, an internally focused
executive regulatory scheme may lack the long-term stability of a
similar statutory scheme, but it is attractive as a second-best response
to mitigate or moot any political impasse or judicial disruption to the
existing insulation for adjudicators. In fact, impartiality regulations can
go beyond at-will removal to improve the impartiality of agency
adjudication, for example, by prohibiting ex parte contacts and limiting
how agencies go about awarding pay bonuses to adjudicators. In other
words, whether or not the Supreme Court places ALJs outside of Free
Enterprise’s tiered-removal prohibition, impartiality regulations are a
useful device for legitimizing and ameliorating agency adjudication.
Impartiality regulations do not undermine the president’s
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”28 The
Take Care Clause requires the executive to ensure agency adjudicators
are impartial under the Due Process Clause as much as it requires the

25. See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 675–
76, 710–14 (2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Standing For] (discussing the Roberts Court’s consistently
formalist approach to separation of powers, including the president’s removal power under
Article II, and calling for a more functional approach).
26. See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 14, at 832–35 (proposing that the
D.C. Circuit appoint and remove ALJs to protect ALJ impartiality without implicating Free
Enterprise Fund’s dual for-cause prohibition).
27. See infra Part II.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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executive to enforce regulatory statutes faithfully in a manner that does
not violate other constitutional rights. Control and insulation are both
useful, if not necessary, tools for executive enforcement. And even in
the absence of constitutional imperatives, impartiality and tiered
insulation for adjudicators inure to the benefit of not only regulated
parties but also agencies themselves by giving executive action more
legitimacy. The executive’s provision of civil service protections during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries strongly suggests that the
executive recognizes the long-term benefits of insulating executive
officials.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers the agencyadjudicator dilemma (i.e., the dilemma of insulating adjudicators from
at-will removal in a way that protects their impartiality without
offending the president’s supervisory power under Article II), how it
developed, and some of the potential, but lacking, solutions. Part II
reviews the theoretical grounding of internal separation of powers and
its current uses. It then discusses the executive branch’s long-standing
use of executive orders to protect executive officials from at-will
removal. Part III details how the executive branch should go about
resolving the agency-adjudicator dilemma via impartiality regulations.
Specifically, this Part proposes creating impartiality regulations to
address the removal, hiring, and other indicia of impartiality for agency
adjudicators. Finally, Part III considers potential obstacles to the
promulgation of impartiality regulations, including hostility or
disinterest from current or future administrations. Ultimately,
impartiality regulations indicate that the executive is not simply at the
mercy of Congress or judicial doctrine. The executive has, if you will,
its own agency in improving its supervision and insulation of agency
adjudicators.
I. THE AGENCY-ADJUDICATOR DILEMMA
The dilemma over administrative-adjudicator insulation boils
down to how to balance political and managerial control or supervision
with impartiality. For instance, the Trump administration has sought to
impose significant case-processing goals on immigration judges to
ensure prompt adjudication. The immigration judges, for their part,
contend that the goals are unrealistic and improperly encourage them
to limit hearings and deny immigrants’ claims—consistent with the
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administration’s expressed preference.29 This Part considers how
dilemmas like this arise under the Take Care and Due Process Clauses
by considering each clause’s development, how the Court has sought
to avoid resolving the dilemma, and previously proposed solutions.
This agency-adjudicator dilemma has come to encompass two
similar, but distinct, groups of federal adjudicators. The first are ALJs,
who number around two thousand.30 ALJs were created by the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”) to preside over “on
the record” agency hearings.31 As discussed in more detail in later
parts, the APA requires ALJs to be “impartial” and limits their duties,
ex parte contacts, and agency supervision.32 Until recently, agencies
selected ALJs under a merit-based process led by the Office of
Personnel Management (“OPM”) that limited agencies to hiring one
of the three top-scoring candidates.33 A recent executive order,
however, has removed ALJs from the “competitive service” and
permitted direct agency hiring.34 Agencies can take adverse actions, as
defined by statute, against ALJs “only for good cause established and
determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board [(“MSPB”)] on the
record after opportunity for hearing.”35 ALJs cannot receive
performance reviews or bonuses.36
Lacking any uniform title, the second group of adjudicators is
often collectively, if inelegantly, styled as simply “non-ALJ
adjudicators” or “non-ALJs” for short. Although difficult to define,37

29. See Barnett, Some Kind of Hearing Officer, supra note 13, at 517–18 (discussing the
current debate over the supervision of immigration judges).
30. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 6 (listing 1,931 ALJs).
31. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(a)–(b) (2018) (discussing on-the-record hearings).
32. See infra Part III.
33. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1654–55
(2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Against Administrative Judges] (describing the long-standing ALJhiring process).
34. Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018). For additional thoughts on
the executive order and changes to ALJ hiring, see Kent Barnett, Raiding the OPM Den: The
New Method of ALJ Hiring, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 11, 2018),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/raiding-the-opm-den-the-new-method-of-alj-hiring-by-kent-barnett
[https://perma.cc/L6Q6-PV73]. Senators Maria Cantwell and Susan Collins have introduced a bill
to largely restore and codify the traditional OPM-led ALJ-hiring process. ALJ Competitive
Service Restoration Act, S. 2348, 116th Cong. (2019).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a)–(b) (2018).
36. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1655–56 (discussing
limitations on supervising or rewarding ALJs).
37. See infra Part III.A.2.
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they number more than ten thousand under broad definitions.38 One
empirical study has determined that of 432 federal adjudicatory
schemes, 103 are presided over by ALJs, while 230 are presided over
by non-ALJ adjudicators.39 Non-ALJ adjudicators go by many titles,
including hearing officer, administrative judge, or immigration judge.40
They may or may not be created by statute,41 and no uniform provisions
govern their impartiality and job performance. They are hired from
within and from outside the agency. They are usually subject to
performance reviews and eligible for bonuses. They can be removed or
disciplined only for cause with review by the MSPB. Unlike with ALJs,
the MSPB does not itself initially determine whether cause exists to
discipline or remove non-ALJ adjudicators.42
A. Due Process
Due process requires that all adjudicators—whether judicial or
administrative and whether in federal or state proceedings—be
impartial.43 Because partiality can be extremely difficult to prove,
partiality inquiries nearly always concern the objective risk,
probability, potential, or appearance of partiality.44 Creating an
appearance of impartiality serves as a prophylaxis for limiting
unconscious partiality and thus for achieving actual impartiality.45

38. Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status,
Selection, Oversight, and Removal, 53 GA. L. REV. 1, 33–34 fig.1 (2019).
RESEARCH,
https://acus.law.stanford.edu/schemes
39. Schemes,
ADJUDICATION
[https://perma.cc/PD4F-S2C9] (sorting by Type A for schemes presided over by ALJs and Type
B for those presided over by non-ALJs).
40. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1659–60; Barnett &
Wheeler, supra note 38, at 37–38 fig.3 (listing the numerous reported titles for non-ALJ
adjudicators).
41. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1659.
42. See generally Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, for an in-depth discussion over their
indicia of impartiality. Compare 5 C.F.R. § 1201.2 (noting MSPB’s original jurisdiction extends to
actions against ALJs), id. § 1201.137 (noting that agencies must file complaints with the MSPB to
take a proposed adverse action against ALJs), and id. § 1201.140 (2019) (noting that MSPB
permits adverse action against an ALJ only if the MSPB finds “good cause”), with id. § 1201.21
(noting MSPB hears appeals from employees against whom agencies have taken adverse action).
43. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).
44. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1671–73; see also generally
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016) (referring to the “appearance of
neutrality”); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884, 886, 887 (2009) (describing the
appropriate standard as one of probability, risk, and potential).
45. See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011
BYU L. REV. 943, 966–67 (discussing the difficulty in ferreting out actual bias).
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Which circumstances create the risk or appearance of partiality
are far from clear, although the Supreme Court has recently identified
new factors to consider. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
following can serve as indicia of partiality: substantial contributions for
judicial elections;46 remuneration or other “direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest” tied to judicial decisions;47 a current
judge’s prior involvement in a case as counsel for a party;48 and certain
relationships between judges and parties or their counsel.49 Perhaps
most relevant for administrative adjudicators, the Court has
reemphasized in the Article II context that “one who holds his office
only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”50
Nevertheless, the Court has never ruled directly on agencies’ ability to
remove, discipline, or reward their adjudicators or indicated whether
any particular limitations on these actions exist.
Yet even from the Supreme Court’s rough sketch of due process’s
requirements, the concerns over agencies or the president removing
administrative adjudicators at will is obvious. If agency superiors can
remove adjudicators at will—or, as is the case with certain non-ALJ
adjudicators, can award them bonuses51—then the agency superiors
can exert pressure on the adjudicators to rule in agency-friendly ways.
This concern is most pronounced in enforcement proceedings when, as
is often the case, the agency is a party.52 But even when the agency is

46. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
47. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
48. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905.
49. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 n.11 (1982).
50. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)). In fact, when interpreting a statute that permitted the
adjudication of war claims before a commission, the Court inferred that Congress intended for
the commissioners to have protection from at-will removal:
If, as one must take for granted, the War Claims Act precluded the President from
influencing the Commission in passing on a particular claim, a fortiori must it be
inferred that Congress did not wish to have hang over the Commission the Damocles’
sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have
on that Commission men of his own choosing.
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
51. See generally Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 73–83 (discussing reported non-ALJ
adjudicators who are eligible and receive bonuses from their agencies).
52. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248
(1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 262 (1946) [hereinafter APA LEG. HISTORY] (noting that
the need for adjudicator independence was at its apex when agencies were a party to “accusatory”
proceedings).
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not a party, the agency may have preferences that it subtly seeks to
impose on adjudicators. Indeed, even those who adhere to strong
executive-power theories of presidential authority often recognize the
problem with permitting the president or agency superiors to instruct
agency adjudicators on how to rule.53
Yet due process impartiality principles must have some kind of
exception or slack for administrative adjudication or else they would
cease to exist in their current form. Under general administrative law
principles, the head of an agency can reverse an agency adjudicator’s
decision in toto and can even hear adjudications in the first instance.54
Because numerous heads of agencies—including all Cabinet-level
heads—can be removed by the president at will and hear or review
adjudications, any absolute impartiality rule that required insulation
from at-will removal would entirely destabilize agency adjudication in
existing nonindependent executive agencies. In effect, adjudications
for such agencies would violate due process unless Congress acted to
provide protection from the president’s at-will removal. The fact that
agency adjudication by agency officials subject to at-will removal goes
back to the Founding severely undercuts, or at least complicates, a
broad application of due process to all agency officials.55
The need for such a significant impartiality exception only arose
after the Court expanded the reach of due process.56 Traditionally, due
process applied only to the deprivation of one’s “right” to life, liberty,

53. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing
the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 233–34 (1998)
(“[E]ven the most ardent presidentialists have been careful to insist that the Chief Executive
could not intervene to direct the outcome of particular cases.”).
54. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2018) (permitting “the agency,” “one or more members of the
body which comprises the agency,” or an ALJ to take evidence); id. § 557(b) (confirming that
“the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision” when reviewing
decisions); Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency
Adjudication, 107 CAL. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2019) (noting that the traditional model of federal
agency adjudication leaves decision-making authority with the agency head).
55. Cf. James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem of
Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agencies, 64
ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 73–74 (2012) (discussing the adjudicatory system concerning benefits for
Revolutionary War veterans and their widows, and the Supreme Court’s constitutional and
pragmatic concerns with judicial involvement in benefits adjudication run by the Secretary of
War).
56. Cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, Constitutionally Conforming Agency Adjudication, 2 LOY. J.
REG. COMP. 22, 42–51 (2017) (arguing for a more limited sphere of appropriate agency
adjudication and noting changes in due process and Article III doctrine).
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or property—not the awarding or revocation of benefits or privileges.57
Until the early twentieth century, nearly all federal administrative
action concerned benefits or privileges.58 Relevant deprivations would
occur only with judicial process, as due process included one’s right to
Article III courts.59 But due process’s reach expanded significantly in
the twentieth century. Regulatory enforcement grew60 as judicial
review shrank.61 And perhaps most importantly, the Court reconceived
protected “property” interests to include “legitimate claim[s] of
entitlement” to what would have been traditionally characterized as
benefits and privileges.62 Without these developments, due process—
and especially its impartiality prong—may have reached very little
administrative adjudication.
Nonetheless, before due process’s expanded reach to government
benefits, Congress and agencies recognized the relationship between
financial incentives and the impartiality of agency and judicial
adjudication. When an agency or other federal officials received what
Professor Nicholas Parrillo refers to as “facilitative payments”—
payments from those needing a government benefit or service63—they
skirted required factual findings or other legislative limitations when
adjudicating matters related to citizenship, veterans’ benefits, and
federal land. By doing so, they encouraged lucrative payments from
future applicants. Congress, in response, moved these decisions to
salaried officials and prohibited those officials from accepting
facilitative payments. Notably, Congress recognized that an
adjudicator’s incentive to continue or increase his income could
influence decision-making, even if Congress had not tied the
57. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates
for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1650–51 (1992).
58. See Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s
Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 798, 819 (1986) (discussing the expansion
of the concept of “public rights” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
59. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1720, 1802–03 (2012) (stating that “Article III limited the range of cases in
which Congress could violate due process by exercising quasi-judicial power” while recognizing
the open question of “whether the Due Process Clause . . . still requires that some traditional core
of cases be decided in court, rather than in executive-branch agencies”).
60. See Young, supra note 58, at 819–23 (discussing a shift to increased administrative
enforcement).
61. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46–50 (1932) (discussing the permissibility of
deferential review to agency fact finding even in matters between private parties).
62. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
63. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 2 (2013).
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adjudicator’s pay to how he ruled in any particular case.64 The key
difference between concerns then and now is not the nature of the
incentive but whom the financial incentives benefit. Then, the
individual who approached the agency paid the fee and stood to
benefit. Now, the agency—often a party to agency adjudication and
empowered to review, pay bonuses to, and take adverse action against
the adjudicator—stands to influence the adjudicator.
Where does this discussion of impartiality leave us? Due process’s
impartiality requirements apply to agency adjudication; the Court
recognizes the relationship between impartiality and at-will removal
and financial incentives; and due process most likely softens or mutes
the binary quality of impartiality’s reach to some agency adjudicators—
namely, the heads of agencies. From this, one might conclude that
Congress has significant authority to regulate presidential supervision
of agency adjudicators, even if the Due Process Clause does not
mandate any particular resolution of the tensions within the Supreme
Court’s due process jurisprudence.
B. The Take Care Clause
The Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II complicate
matters, however. Many leading scholars and jurists think Congress, in
the well-known “Decision of 1789,” decided that the Constitution
permitted the president to remove executive officers alone, even
without impeachment proceedings.65 James Madison argued that
removal by the president alone encourages executive officials to be
more faithful and prompt in discharging their duties.66 Similar concerns
continue today, as governmental supervisors often complain of their
inability to discipline or remove “nonproductive or insubordinate
employees.”67
64. See id. at 19–23, 125–79 (discussing key examples of the problems with facilitative
payments and Congress’s response).
65. See generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1021, 1022–26 (2006) (describing the nature of the debate and its contested meaning to
scholars and jurists). Others have argued that its meaning is ambiguous. See id. at 1023–25
(discussing the views of scholars Edward Corwin and David Currie, and Justice Louis Brandeis
in dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
66. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 495, 499 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James
Madison).
67. Frug, supra note 23, at 945 (quoting JOHN W. MACY, PUBLIC SERVICE: THE HUMAN
SIDE OF GOVERNMENT 20 (1971)). Moreover, as Professor Frug suggests, a good-cause limitation
can prove problematic in practice, even if not in theory. Id. at 946. One of the practical problems
is defining “good cause” in its various formulations. One common form of good-cause removal
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Over time, the Court recognized that Article II permits certain
congressionally imposed limitations on removal. In brief, Congress can
limit at-will removal of inferior officers appointed by department
heads68 or by a court of law,69 and Senate-confirmed principal officers.70
The Court has even gone so far as to interpret a statute, despite its
silence on the matter, as requiring good-cause removal for certain
principal officers with only adjudicatory duties.71 Moreover, the Civil
Service Act of 1978 prohibits at-will removal for the federal civil
service,72 and I am unaware of any challenge under Article II to that
statutory scheme. These decisions suggest that statutory limitations on
agency adjudicators’ at-will removal—whether or not compelled by
due process—are permissible under Article II, especially for the
numerous inferior officers or employees.
Then along came Free Enterprise Fund. There, the Court
considered whether the good-cause removal protections for the
PCAOB members violated Article II. Under the Board’s
implementing statute, the SEC could appoint members for staggered
five-year terms73 and could remove them for only extremely limited
causes.74 Based on the parties’ agreement, the Court assumed that,
permits removal for only “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” E.g., 12 U.S.C.
§ 5491(c)(3) (2012). In a recent case, judges on the en banc D.C. Circuit jousted over whether the
president could remove officers with such good-cause protection for mere policy disagreements.
Compare PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 122–24 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J., concurring)
(“Such a capacious construction would essentially remove the concept of ‘independence’ from
‘independent agencies.’”), with id. at 134–35, 136–37 (Griffin, J., concurring) (“[T]hese removal
grounds . . . provide only a minimal restriction on the President’s removal power, even permitting
him to remove the Director for ineffective policy choices.”). Notably, the Supreme Court had
earlier stated that its precedents would not suggest that a president could remove an officer over
mere policy disagreements. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 502 (2010) (“[T]he
Government does not contend that simple disagreement with the Board’s policies or priorities
could constitute ‘good cause’ for its removal. . . . Nor do our precedents suggest as much.”).
68. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (upholding the Secretary of the
Navy’s ability to remove a cadet engineer only through court martial).
69. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (upholding good-cause removal for
a special counsel appointed by the Special Division of the D.C. Circuit).
70. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (upholding limitations
on at-will removal of a Federal Trade commissioner).
71. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1958) (interpreting a statute to permit
only for-cause removal of War Claims commissioners).
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2018). The statutory scheme also provides for administrative
appeal to the MSPB and judicial review of the MSPB’s order. See id. §§ 7701(a), 7703(a).
73. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010).
74. Id. at 486. The SEC could remove the PCAOB members after a formal hearing for the
willful violation of certain laws, the willful abuse of authority, and unreasonable failure to enforce
certain accounting laws. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2012).
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despite congressional silence, the president could remove the SEC
commissioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.”75 The Court held that Congress’s cocooning of the PCAOB
members within two “tiers” of protection from the president violated
the Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II.76 Although the Court
had earlier upheld protection from at-will removal for both principal
officers like the SEC commissioners and inferior officers appointed by
a department head like the PCAOB members, the Court held that the
two otherwise permissible tiers were unconstitutional when combined.
The problem was that the president could not hold the SEC
accountable for its oversight of the PCAOB as he could for all of its
other actions. Because neither the president nor anyone under his
direct control had full authority over the PCAOB, Congress had
dispersed responsibility for government action throughout the
administrative state and insulated the president from political
accountability for executive actions.77
The dissenting Justices identified many officials and statutory
schemes with tiered protections from at-will removal that the
majority’s decision threatened. They included umpteen Senior
Executive Service members in the civil service (including numerous
senior leaders in scientific agencies), military personnel, much of the
federal civil service,78 and—most importantly for my purposes—
administrative law judges.79 Recall that agencies can remove or
otherwise take adverse action against ALJs “only for good cause
established and determined by the [MSPB] on the record after
opportunity for hearing.”80 The MSPB’s members, who are appointed
to seven-year terms following Senate confirmation, are also protected
from at-will removal.81 A small number of non-ALJ adjudicators have
the same statutory protection as ALJs from at-will removal.82

75. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620).
76. Id. at 484.
77. See id. at 496–97.
78. See id. at 538–42, 543–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 542–43.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018).
81. Id. § 1202(a), (d).
82. See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(3) (2012) (“Members of the Civilian Board are subject to
removal in the same manner as administrative law judges, as provided in section 7521 of title 5.”).
There are currently fourteen judges on the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. See Judges,
U.S. CIVILIAN BD. OF CONTRACT APPEALS, https://www.cbca.gov/board/judges.html
[https://perma.cc/WM4U-K5JU] (this number of judges is current as of December 2019).
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Numerous litigants have taken notice and asserted Article II removalbased challenges against ALJs.83
Nearly all other non-ALJ agency adjudicators are in a similar,
although not identical, state as ALJs. Civil service protections shelter
non-ALJ adjudicators from at-will removal.84 But their protection from
removal is not as robust as the protection for ALJs.85 Although the
MSPB reviews adverse actions against civil servants by their employing
agencies86 and requires a rational basis or substantial evidence for the
action,87 the MSPB does not determine whether cause for the adverse
action exists in the first instance.88 If the MSPB’s more limited review
somehow does not bring the civil service—including non-ALJ
adjudicators—within Free Enterprise Fund’s prohibition, many nonALJ adjudicators work for independent agencies whose head the

83. See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); Cochran v. SEC, No. 4:19-CV-066A, 2019 WL 1359252, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2019); Morris & Dickson Co. v. Whitaker, 360 F.
Supp. 3d 434, 437 (W.D. La. 2018); Bennett v. SEC, 151 F. Supp. 3d 632, 634 (D. Md. 2015), aff’d,
844 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, No. 15–CV–2472, 2015 WL 4006165, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 30, 2015), aff’d, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304–05 (N.D.
Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded by 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d
382, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2018) (“Under regulations prescribed by [OPM], an agency may take
an action covered by this subchapter against an employee only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service.”).
85. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1333 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Section
7513 [the provisions of protection for removal for the civil service] contains a lower threshold to
support removal than does § 7521 [the provision that protects ALJs from removal].”). The
Federal Circuit, however, declined to consider the “circumstances which could justify a removal
for such cause as would promote the efficiency of service.” Id. at 1333 n.5.
86. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d).
87. See Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007, 1012 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting that courts applied
either the rational-basis or substantial-evidence standards).
88. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (referring to the MSPB’s ability to determine and establish
whether good cause exists), with id. § 7513(a), (d) (permitting an agency itself to take action and
later appeal). The legislative history expands further on the merits of securing greater
independence for ALJs in this context:
Recognizing that the entire tradition of the Civil Service Commission is directed
toward security of tenure, it seems wise to put that tradition to use in the present case.
However, additional powers are conferred upon the Commission. It must afford any
examiner an opportunity for a hearing before acceding to an agency request for
removal, and even then its action would be subject to judicial review.
S. REP. NO. 752 (1946), reprinted in APA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 29. Accord H. REP. NO.
1980 (1946), reprinted in APA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 280. During the House
proceedings on the APA, Representative Francis Walter noted that the ALJs’ protections from
removal were intended to be “full and complete,” as compared to that for the civil service. 79
CONG. REC. (1946), reprinted in APA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 371.
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president can remove only for cause and thus enjoy two tiers of
protection from at-will removal nonetheless.89
C. Avoiding and Resolving the Agency-Adjudicator Dilemma
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund
directly identified the tension between the Take Care and Due Process
Clauses when discussing ALJs. But both sides appeared to recognize
either the constitutional or pragmatic concerns of extending Free
Enterprise Fund too far. Responding to the dissenting Justices’ fears,
the majority briefly proposed in a footnote two ways of distinguishing
ALJs—and perhaps the entire civil service—from Free Enterprise
Fund’s two-tier prohibition. First, the Court suggested that ALJs were
merely “employees,” not “inferior officers” like the PCAOB members.
Second, the Court suggested that ALJs had adjudicatory functions,
while PCAOB members did not.90 But as the dissent retorted, even if
these suggestions could limit Free Enterprise Fund’s holding, neither is
compelling.91 If these or some other exceptions do not apply to
adjudicators, the most likely remedy for a two-tier prohibition—
severing one of the two tiers—either exacerbates impartiality concerns
or creates more considerable problems.
1. Constitutional Status. The majority first suggested that its
holding might not reach ALJs because they might be only employees,
not inferior officers.92 That suggestion was short-lived. The Court
confirmed only a few years later in Lucia v. SEC that the SEC’s ALJs
were indeed inferior officers based on two factors that the Court

89. Based on my earlier co-authored empirical project on federal non-ALJ adjudicators, the
following independent agencies’ non-ALJ adjudicators appear to implicate Free Enterprise
Fund’s tiered-protection prohibition (if the non-ALJs qualify as “officers of the United States”):
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Labor Relations Authority, MSPB, National Labor
Relations Board, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at
123–27 app. C.
90. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB , 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010).
91. Id. at 536 (discussing the majority’s proposed adjudication-based exception); see id. at
542 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing certain Justices’ earlier characterizations of ALJs as
officers).
92. Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion). The Court has distinguished “Officers of the United
States,” to whom the Appointments Clause applies, and employees, to whom it does not. The
former “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam), while the latter are “lesser functionaries subordinate
to officers of the United States,” id. at 126 n.162.
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applied in one of its earlier decisions, Freytag v. Commissioner.93 First,
the ALJs held “a continuing office established by law.”94 Second, they
wielded trial-judge-like powers, including the ability to take testimony,
receive and rule on the admissibility of evidence, preside over trials,
enforce compliance with discovery orders, and punish “contemptuous
conduct” at the hearing.95 The Court clarified that inferior-officer
status did not depend upon the SEC’s ALJs having the authority to
issue final orders.96 Although Lucia did not go so far as to characterize
all agencies’ ALJs as inferior officers, all ALJs hold continuous
positions established by law and carry out similar trial-like functions.97
Moreover, the Lucia Court was not receptive to making fine-grain
distinctions between the SEC’s ALJs and the tax-court judges at issue
in Freytag.98 Accordingly, the majority’s first proposed distinction
between PCAOB members and ALJs has very likely disappeared.
The Lucia holding probably reaches some non-ALJ adjudicators
as well. The diversity of non-ALJ adjudicators’ duties and legal geneses
renders it difficult to determine how many may be inferior officers.
Yet, at least some non-ALJ adjudicators’ statuses are in play. Agencies
have reported more than ten thousand non-ALJ adjudicators who can
preside over adversarial hearings.99 While overseeing such hearings,
non-ALJ adjudicators likely wield many powers exercised by trial
judges or ALJs—satisfying Freytag’s second prong. Indeed, Freytag
itself held that certain tax-court judges—Article II non-ALJs, mind

93. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
94. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018). The Court noted that the SEC’s ALJs have a
career appointment with their “duties, salary, and means of appointment” provided by statute (or
implementing regulations). See id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878).
95. Id. at 2053–54.
96. See id. at 2053 n.4 (rejecting the view that “final decisionmaking authority is a sine qua
non of officer status”).
97. Perhaps the Court would distinguish the ALJs who work for the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) from the SEC ALJs because they hold inquisitorial, as opposed to
adversarial, hearings. But the Lucia factors would appear to apply equally to SSA ALJs: the SSA
ALJs perform the functions that the Lucia Court identified, and—at any rate—they sometimes
hold adversarial hearings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1765(a) (2019).
98. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054–55 (dismissing distinctions concerning adjudicators’
compliance powers and agency superiors’ deference to their decisions).
99. Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 8. In the study, we asked agencies to report whether
they had “Non-ALJ Hearings,” which in brief were those in which “[o]ne of the parties to the
adjudication can—by statute, regulation, or other law—obtain an oral hearing over which an
agency official presides to present evidence, even if most matters are handled through written
submissions without an oral hearing.” Id. at 25. For the full definition and exceptions, see id.
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you—were inferior officers.100 Moreover, in Lucia’s aftermath, the
solicitor general counseled federal agencies to treat their non-ALJ
adjudicators as inferior officers.101 The government has also agreed in
recent litigation that administrative judges for the Department of
Housing and Urban Development were inferior officers.102 Relatedly,
the Federal Circuit recently held that the more than two hundred
administrative patent judges103 were principal—not merely inferior—
officers based, in part, on their civil service protection from at-will
removal.104
Whether non-ALJ adjudicators hold continuing positions
established by law is a more challenging question. Some are hired on
an ad hoc or part-time basis,105 although it appears that most have
continuing positions.106 However, some of their positions may not be
specified by statute, as ALJs’ are. For instance, immigration judges
have a direct statutory genesis,107 but Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission administrative judges do not.108 Nonetheless, the exact
contours of an office “established by [l]aw” are not well-defined.
Congress may not need to refer to a position as an “office” or even
specifically identify the office. Instead, the Office of Legal Counsel has
focused more on the nature of the duties performed and the continuous
nature of the position, perhaps reading the “established by [l]aw”
predicate out of Article II altogether.109 In short, Lucia’s holding may
sweep up numerous non-ALJ adjudicators, but its reach is not easy to
determine.

100. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) as the
decision that “decides this case”).
101. See Memorandum from the Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Agency Gen.
Counsels, Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.) 3 (July 2018)
[hereinafter SG Mem.].
102. See Associated Mortg. Bankers, Inc. v. Carson, No. CV 17-0075, 2019 WL 108882, at *5,
*7 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2019).
103. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
104. Id. at 1327–29.
105. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 35 (noting that of the reported non-ALJs,
“[o]nly 39 of the 10,831 non-ALJs . . . are part-time agency employees”). As an example, the
FDIC reported that it hired hearing officers on an ad hoc basis. See id. at 34 fig.1.
106. See id. at 39–48.
107. See Jennifer L. Cotton, If Established by Law, Then an Administrative Judge Is an
Officer, 53 GA. L. REV. 309, 333 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012)).
108. See id.
109. See Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C.
117–19 (2007).





1714





  

 

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

  

[Vol. 69:1695

Yet, a first-order question remains: Even if certain non-ALJs are
not “Officers of the United States,” why should it matter for purposes
of Free Enterprise Fund’s two-tier prohibition whether the subordinate
is an officer or an employee? Perhaps the idea is that the president
needs to be able to supervise all executive officials who “exercis[e]
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”110
because of their policymaking authority. But should the president not
have just as much authority over employees who execute ministerial
functions, especially if the employee is bad at his job? Those
functions—such as the ministerial duty of delivering a commission in
Marbury v. Madison111—are equally necessary for “the Laws [to] be
faithfully executed” under the Take Care Clause.112 Thus, although this
distinction could save much of the civil service’s insulation, it lacks any
obvious normative basis.
2. Adjudication Function. Because constitutional status no longer
distinguishes ALJs from the PCAOB members in Free Enterprise
Fund, the Court could instead rely upon its second proposed ground:
all adjudicators, or at least those who provide recommended decisions,
are different in kind from the policymaking PCAOB members.113 This
distinction between policymaking and adjudication is “fairly intuitive”
because adjudicators are often understood to maintain the rule of
law,114 not create or enforce it. It also has historical support. For
example, the drafters of the APA gave ALJs—but not other agency
officials—protection from at-will removal “to render [ALJs]
independent and secure in their tenure and compensation.”115 Indeed,
even James Madison, a strong proponent of the president’s removal
power, thought that an administrative adjudicator who presides over
hearings in which the United States is a party “should not hold his
office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the Government.”116
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 158 (1803).
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
113. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010).
114. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1751 (2009).
115. S. REP. NO. 752 (1945), reprinted in APA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 29.
Representative Francis Walter of Pennsylvania noted that his concern that run-of-the-mill civil
service protections were “exaggerated” led him to support the more robust protection for ALJs.
79 CONG. REC. (1946), reprinted in APA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 371.
116. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611–12 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James
Madison) (cited in PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J.,
concurring)).
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The Wiener Court later relied upon an executive official’s adjudicatory
duties to interpret a statute as limiting the president’s at-will removal.
In dismissing recent challenges to ALJs’ double insulation from at-will
removal, lower courts have quickly adopted this adjudication–
policymaking distinction.117
The initial problem with this justification is that it may not
distinguish ALJs from the PCAOB members. The Free Enterprise
Court framed its holding as applying to an “inferior officer [who]
determines the policy and enforces the laws of the United States”118
and stated that the PCAOB members did not exercise adjudicatory
functions.119 The dissenters responded that the majority decision itself
expressly listed the PCAOB members’ adjudicatory responsibilities
when describing their powers.120 Indeed, numerous agency heads, like
the PCAOB members, have both adjudicatory and other policymaking
authority.121
Nonetheless, even if one can meaningfully distinguish between
PCAOB members and ALJs by considering adjudicatory or
policymaking functions, cleaving adjudication from “policymaking” is
exceedingly difficult. As scholars122 and the Supreme Court itself have
117. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (declining to resolve
the issue but having “serious doubts” about removal provisions’ unconstitutionality based on the
ALJs’ adjudicatory nature), vacated and remanded on other grounds by 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.
2016); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 2d 382, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016). D.C. Circuit Judges Wilkins and Rogers distinguished
Free Enterprise Fund by arguing that the “good cause” protection for ALJs, as opposed to the
more protective statutory for-cause provision for PCAOB members, permitted the president or
department heads to have sufficient supervisory control. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 116 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J., concurring). The majority in Free Enterprise Fund suggested that the
different removal standards might permit distinction. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 502–03,
506. The dissenting justices, however, criticized the majority for failing to make any such
suggestion clear. See id. at 537 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484.
119. See id. at 507 n.10 (“And unlike members of the Board, many administrative law judges
of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions . . . .”).
120. See id. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 485 (majority opinion) (discussing PCAOB’s
authority to “initiate[] formal investigations and disciplinary proceedings” and sanction regulated
parties).
121. See Jellum, supra note 19, at 734 (noting that “members of the [PCAOB] performed
adjudicative functions” as well as policymaking functions).
122. See generally Charles Koch, Jr., Administrative Judges’ Role in Developing Social Policy,
68 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1100–02 (2008) (recognizing that ALJs have “the dual role of applying
general agency policy and assuring individual fairness in its application”); Charles H. Koch, Jr.,
Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 740 (2005) (emphasizing the
demands imposed on ALJs based on “[t]he operation of administrative policy development
within the administrative adjudicative machinery”).
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recognized,123 adjudication is simply one method through which
agencies make policy. One only need consider the NLRB’s longstanding reliance on adjudication for confirmation.124 Moreover, all
lawful agency action is, and must be, an exercise of the executive power
under the separation of powers. Execution of the law occurs via
prosecution or enforcement, rulemaking (quasi-legislative power), and
adjudication (quasi-judicial power).125
Perhaps the Court meant to distinguish those who have final
adjudicatory—and thus final policymaking—authority from officials
who do not. After all, the Court, in the same breath in which it
mentioned the adjudication-based distinction, also indicated that
ALJs, unlike PCAOB members, “possess purely recommendatory
powers.”126 But that, too, is troubling. The statutory default under the
APA is that ALJs can issue final—not recommended—orders unless
the agency provides otherwise in a specific case or by rule across the
board.127 Numerous non-ALJ adjudicators can also issue final orders.128
Moreover, it is far from clear that agencies’ use of their discretion to
limit ALJs from issuing final decisions in all or specific cases would
avoid offending Article II. The Court unanimously held in the
nondelegation context that agencies could not cure a separation-ofpowers violation by limiting the power that Congress gave agencies in
a statute.129 Finally, although courts could distinguish certain ALJs or
non-ALJs from the PCAOB members by looking to some kind of
actual or possible final-order authority, they will dig themselves into

123. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
124. Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 2255, 2278 (2019).
125. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.28 (1988) (noting the difficulty in defining
purely executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-adjudicative categories, and noting that all of these
powers are “‘executive’ at least to some degree”).
126. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2018). See also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 152 (1993), which
stated:
[I]nitial decisions could become final agency decisions in the absence of an agency
appeal. Agencies may avoid the finality of an initial decision, first, by adopting a rule
that an agency appeal be taken before judicial review is available, and, second, by
providing that the initial decision would be ‘inoperative’ pending appeal. Otherwise,
the initial decision becomes final and the aggrieved party is entitled to judicial review.
(citation omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)).
128. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 53 fig.16 (detailing what kind of non-ALJs may
issue final orders).
129. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001) (rejecting the
argument that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation by limiting its own statutory authority).
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the exact fact-bound, labyrinthine Article II warren that the Lucia
Court sought to avoid under the Appointments Clause.130
Finally, perhaps the Court meant (or might elect) to exclude
“dedicated adjudicators”—those without rulemaking, enforcement, or
other policymaking authority—from Free Enterprise Fund’s doubleinsulation prohibition.131 After all, one plausible distinction between
ALJs and non-ALJs, on one hand, and the PCAOB members, on the
other hand, is that only the former have a purely adjudicative
function.132 But an adjudicator-based exception would be inconsistent
with the Court’s formalist doctrine. The Court’s double-insulation
prohibition was formal because the Court held that two, but not one,
good-cause provisions were problematic without explaining how the
second provision materially limited the president’s supervisory
authority.133 In fact, the dissenters explained at length the rarity—if it
has ever happened—of the second provision having any effect on the
president’s supervision.134 For the majority, though, the importance of
the president’s barely or theoretically affected supervisory authority
was more important than any perceived benefits from double
insulation.135 An adjudicator-only exception would exist, however,
because it recognizes the functional benefit of limiting the supervisory
power to promote impartiality and the functional difference between
adjudication in the main and policymaking tools. The benefit of
adjudicatory impartiality would trump the rule-based certainty and
formality of double insulation. If a functional exception exists for
adjudicators under Article II, that exception at the very least conflicts
with the Court’s separation-of-powers formalism and more
problematically undermines the normative force of formalism
altogether.136
3. Shedding a Tier. If neither Free Enterprise Fund distinction
prevails, the most likely outcome is that the Court will sever one of the
130. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
131. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2413
(2011).
132. See id. at 2413–18 (describing scholarship before Free Enterprise Fund that argued for
distinguishing dedicated adjudicators from those with other policymaking tools and providing
interpretations of Free Enterprise Fund that might support that distinction).
133. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 492–508 (2010).
134. Id. at 524–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 498–502 (majority opinion).
136. See Barnett, Standing For, supra note 25, at 674–76 (describing the Court’s turn to
formalism in its separation-of-powers jurisprudence).
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two tiers that exists for ALJs and numerous non-ALJ adjudicators. As
I have discussed at length elsewhere, courts frequently sever offending
removal provisions as a cure for Article II violations.137 In Free
Enterprise Fund itself, the Court severed only one of the two tiers of
protections for the PCAOB members.138 The virtue of one-tier
severance for agency adjudicators is that it provides as much protection
from at-will removal as Article II permits under Free Enterprise Fund.
Despite its ease and intuitive appeal, that remedy is no panacea.
Assume that the Court, as it did in Free Enterprise Fund with
PCAOB, severs the provision that directly precludes the at-will
removal of ALJs or non-ALJ adjudicators but leaves the good-cause
protection for the MSPB. This outcome creates impartiality problems,
especially in agency proceedings in which the agency is a party, because
the agency adjudicators are subject to at-will removal and other
adverse action. If the adjudicators’ agencies can remove them at will,
the remaining tier of removal protection for the MSPB becomes
meaningless, or nearly so. The MSPB has nothing to review because
the agency can remove the adjudicator for any reason or caprice,
except perhaps for certain unconstitutional grounds, such as racial
discrimination. Moreover, even if the Court took this route, some
adjudicators work for independent agencies, like the SEC, and would
have two tiers of protection that remain anyway. Severing the
independent agency’s protection would lead to the end of independent
agencies altogether.
Assume this time that the Court severs the MSPB’s protection
from at-will removal but leaves the adjudicators’ immediate protection
in place. The outcome helps protect the adjudicators’ impartiality in
the first instance, but it creates impartiality concerns for the MSPB,
whose members the president could not previously remove at will. Atwill removal of the MSPB fundamentally changes the civil service
statutory scheme and impacts adjudicators and nonadjudicators alike.
Indeed, the fundamental change to the statutory scheme suggests
that severance of the MSPB’s insulation protection is an inappropriate
response. Severance is inappropriate when it “is evident that the
legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within

137. See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in
Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 517–27 (2014) (discussing courts’ use of
severance in separation-of-powers decisions).
138. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508–09.
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its power, independently of that which is not.”139 Although deciphering
legislative intent on severance matters often proves “elusive,”140
severing the MSPB’s protection would erase a key innovation of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 that altered the preexisting at-will
removal that applied to the MSPB’s predecessor, the Civil Service
Commission.141 The Senate Report for the Act, without dissent from
the House Report, noted that the protection from at-will removal was
meant to “ensure that the [MSPB would] be independent of the
direction and control of the president.”142 In short, the case for
severance of the MSPB’s protection imperils the entire civil service and
offends doctrinal limits on severance.
*   *   *
Of course, I have no crystal ball, and I cannot say with any
certainty whether the Supreme Court will provide ALJs and other
agency adjudicators a carve-out from Free Enterprise Fund’s tieredremoval prohibition. It may well be that the Court would find a
functional exception to its formalist jurisprudence that considers
adjudicators’ functions within the executive branch and the competing
due process values. Yet the Court’s rejection of its proposed
officer/employee distinction—in the same footnote in Free Enterprise
Fund as the policymaker/adjudicator distinction—only a few years
later in Lucia should give one pause. In the meantime, the executive
branch can take action to mitigate ill effects from applying Free
Enterprise Fund’s prohibition to ALJs, or to improve agency
adjudication’s legitimacy even if the Court places ALJs outside of the
prohibition.

139. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Champlin Refining Co.
v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
140. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983).
141. See Frug, supra note 23, at 955 (citing Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, pmbl., 22 Stat. 403).
The main debate between the House and the Senate concerned whether the Director of OPM,
not the MSPB, should have protection from the president’s at-will removal. Congress deleted the
protection for the OPM director but sought to provide a measure of independence by providing
him or her a four-year term. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 132 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2865–66; see also 5 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2019) (imposing no for-cause
requirement for removal).
142. S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 28 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2750.
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II. INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
Internal separation of powers or functions within the executive
branch provides an alternative solution to the agency-adjudicator
dilemma. Competition among the branches—through separation of
powers or checks and balances—creates “friction” to improve
governmental decision-making.143 But interbranch competition is often
absent, whether because the separation of branches has become a
separation of political parties;144 Congress has delegated significant
authority to the executive;145 or judicial doctrines limit nuanced,
functional interactions among the branches.146 When branches will not
or cannot limit one another,147 one branch may find it beneficial to limit
its own authority by creating its own friction.148 For instance, the
judiciary may find it wise to rely on self-imposed prudential
doctrines—such as ripeness, primary jurisdiction, or abstention—that
delay or avoid decision-making altogether. Or the Senate may use the
self-imposed filibuster to require supermajorities for passing bills. Or,
as is most relevant here, the executive can and frequently does use
numerous internal devices, including those related to removing
executive officials, to improve its decision-making.
As this Part discusses, these internal devices within the executive
branch—often referred to collectively as “internal administrative
law”—can regulate agency personnel in numerous ways. One way
includes establishing internal separation of powers to create some
independence for agency officials, including adjudicators, from
partisan reprisal. In fact, the executive branch has a long-standing, yet
perhaps overlooked, history of providing civil service protections to

143. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006).
144. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that the Founders’ version of separation of powers has been
replaced by competition between political parties, whereby the branches largely compete only
when the parties do).
145. See Katyal, supra note 143, at 2319 (discussing the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Act and the USA PATRIOT Act after the 9/11 terror attacks).
146. See generally Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 (2017)
(arguing against the judicial inclination that novel statutory provisions that seek to address new
problems violate separation-of-powers or federalism principles).
147. For a recent discussion of how Congress imposes “statutory separation of powers” on
the executive in the energy-regulation sphere, see generally Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory
Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378 (2019).
148. Katyal, supra note 143, at 2317.
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improve the professionalism of executive officials through internal
administrative law.
A. Separation of Powers via Internal Administrative Law
Internal administrative law, in its purest form, concerns
mechanisms or norms that originate from “within the agency or the
executive branch . . . that speak primarily to government personnel.”149
It can both limit and empower agencies,150 and fill an important
regulatory void. For instance, Professors Gillian Metzger and Kevin
Stack argue that judicial control over agencies will never be sufficient
to ease anxieties about the administrative state or successfully
regulate the exercise of administrative power. Instead, core internal
features of agencies—such as management structures, guidance,
planning and coordination, civil service, professionalism, and the
like—need to be recognized as central to administrative law, as they
once were in administrative law’s early years.151

In other words, internal administrative law is a useful, even if
sometimes forgotten, instrument for improving bureaucratic decisionmaking and promoting legitimacy within a democratic government.
Internal administrative law can further many objectives. It can
promote presidential control and efficiency, as then-Professor Elena
Kagan argued in her prominent commendation of centralized
presidential administration.152 Nevertheless, she recognized that good
government needs more than centralization and efficiency.153 Picking
up where Kagan left off, then-Professor Nina Pillard argued that the
president should instruct agencies not to aggrandize executive
authority at every opportunity and instead seek to protect private
rights.154 Doing so can reduce constitutional tensions and avoid
normatively unattractive results.155 Pillard noted that the power of
internal administrative law and executive-made constitutional law

149. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV.
1239, 1251 (2017).
150. Id. at 1248.
151. Id. at 1246–47.
152. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339–41 (2001).
153. See, e.g., id. at 2352–58 (discussing the utility of expertise); id. at 2342–44 (discussing
checks and balances).
154. Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands,
103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 745 (2005).
155. Id. at 749–51.
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permit the executive branch “unilaterally to increase its vigilance
against rights violations.”156 Executive action that curtails individual
rights, in contrast, requires judicial approbation.157 In fact, during the
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, the Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure highlighted how internal
administrative law could protect private rights, especially in the
absence of judicial review.158
One flavor of internal administrative law is internal separation of
powers. Although internal administrative law may often connote a
mechanism for promoting centralized policymaking, as Kagan
suggested,159 the executive can also use it to make it harder to control
particular outcomes. Internal separation of powers disrupts absolute
hierarchical control over personnel or decision-making within one
agency or the entire executive branch. It may pit the executive
bureaucracy against other bureaucrats or political appointees, or
protect one group from another.160
Many of the mechanisms for internal separation of powers are
familiar and demonstrate the ways in which the executive—alone or
with Congress—has limited its ability to act. Professor Neal Katyal
identifies “separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review
of government action by different agencies, civil-service protections for
agency workers, reporting requirements to Congress, and an impartial
decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.”161 Other tools
include the Department of State’s “Dissent Channel.” This channel
permits diplomatic officials to express disagreement with official
position and obtain a response.162 But even less formal independence
can be useful. The day-to-day, de facto freedom that the solicitor
general has from the president and the attorney general gives her the

156. Id. at 682.
157. Id.
158. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 149, at 1274 (“Even in the sphere in which judicial
review is available important private interests must still be left to the practically unreviewable
judgment of the administrative tribunals and reliance be placed on other controls for the fair
exercise of that judgment.” (quoting ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL
REPORT 77 (1941))).
159. Kagan, supra note 152, at 2316, 2384.
160. See Katyal, supra note 143, at 2317 (explaining that internal separation of powers creates
friction and results in better decision-making).
161. Id. at 2318.
162. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 070–075 (2018),
https://fam.state.gov/searchapps/viewer?format=html&query=dissent%20channel&links=DISS
ENT,CHANNEL&url=/FAM/02FAM/02FAM0070.html#M072 [https://perma.cc/7JEF-Q9W5].
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ability to consider the long-term interests of the executive branch and
cultivate authority and credibility with the courts.163
Internal separation of powers, as well as other forms of internal
administrative law, are consistent with the formal unitary executive
theory that has gained prominence in conservative legal circles.164
Under that theory, “all federal officers exercising executive power
must be subject to the direct control of the President.”165 This theory is
deeply suspicious of congressional attempts to limit presidential
control. The theory further divides itself into subtheories that
require—from strongest to weakest—direct presidential control over
all executive decisions, the president’s authority to nullify an officer’s
discretionary decision, or presidential power to fire any principal
executive officer at will.166 Because internal administrative law can be
self-imposed—that is, without Congress—constitutional separation-ofpowers concerns fall away. No other branch is interfering with
executive authority. Relatedly, because the president or agency heads
retain the authority to reverse earlier internal executive actions in
nearly all cases,167 one president cannot bind a later one.168 Because
self-limiting actions do not implicate the constitutional separation of
powers, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he President can always
choose to restrain himself in his dealings with subordinates.”169

163. See Pillard, supra note 154, at 705 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000)); id. at 707 (citing 28
C.F.R. § 0.135 (2004)); id. at 726–33. This is not to say that political actors never intervene in the
solicitor general’s decision-making. See id. at 707 n.94 (describing various ways in which the
solicitor general’s superiors in the Justice Department may involve themselves in litigation
strategies).
164. See generally Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power:
A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2009)
(discussing how the conservative political movement has turned to the unitary executive as a
political tool since the 1970s).
165. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992).
166. See Kitrosser, supra note 114, at 1746.
167. One president can repeal an earlier president’s executive order. See Richard H. Seamon,
Dismantling Monuments, 70 FLA. L. REV. 553, 588 (2018). Likewise, agencies can repeal an earlier
administration’s regulations by using the same process that the agency used to promulgate them
in the first instance. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2018) (defining “rule making” as “formulating . . .
or repealing a rule”); id. § 553 (providing requirements for substantive and other forms of
rulemaking); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009) (noting
that agencies need not demonstrate that the repealed rule is better than the previous rule, but
agencies may have to account for strong reliance interests).
168. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010) (“[The president] cannot . . .
choose to bind his successors by diminishing their powers . . . .”).
169. Id. at 497.
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To be sure, compared to statutory administrative law, internal
administrative law’s significant disadvantage is that it has less
permanence and permits easier repeal. Yet agencies can create more
regulatory permanence by using notice-and-comment procedures for
the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of internal rules.170 Unless
repealed, the regulations would likely have the force of law. For
instance, when President Nixon challenged a subpoena by a special
prosecutor whom the attorney general appointed per executive
regulations, the Court stated in dicta: “So long as this regulation [that
bestows power on the special counsel] remains in force the executive
branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign
composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce
it.”171 Internal administrative law that requires a transparent process
for amendment or repeal provides a “credible commitment” of the
agency’s self-restraint because agencies must follow their own internal
rules.172
B. Protecting Officials from At-Will Removal
Internal separation of powers has an established, though perhaps
largely forgotten, provenance in insulating the federal bureaucracy.
The development of the civil service has been the subject of many
tomes, articles, and government reports. My purpose here is to
demonstrate briefly internal separation of powers’ significant role in
developing the service’s protections from at-will removal.
Presidents have rarely exercised their powers of at-will removal
over lower-level bureaucrats. In the Decision of 1789, Congress
decided—by a decisive vote in the House and one vote in the Senate—
that impeachment was not the exclusive means of removing federal
officials: the president could also remove them.173 However, executiveled removal of civil servants remained extremely rare in the decades

170. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10, at 669 (5th ed.
2010).
171. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974); accord United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954).
172. Metzger & Stack, supra note 149, at 1284 (citing Elizabeth Magill, Foreword, Agency
Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 873–74 (2009)). The Supreme Court has not
resolved the long-standing question as to whether agencies are bound to both their legislative
rules and their nonlegislative guidance, or only the former. Lower courts have come out both
ways. See id. at 1285–86.
173. See Frug, supra note 23, at 949.
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following the Founding and usually only involved removals for cause.174
In fact, presidential behavior did not change even when Congress
enacted the Tenure of Office Act of 1820 to render it easier for the
president to remove federal officials.175 By imposing fixed, four-year
terms for many federal officials and clarifying the president’s ability to
remove them at will, Congress sought to limit any inference that
removal impugned the character of the officials. Nonetheless,
presidents did not take advantage of their authority to fire existing
federal employees at the end of their statutory four-year terms.
Instead, they routinely reappointed employees to additional terms.176
The well-known spoils system—of replacing existing officials with
loyalists—did not begin with gusto until the Jackson administration.
Yet even President Jackson limited his spoils system to approximately
20 percent of the federal bureaucracy.177
Contemporaries recognized the spoils system as a suboptimal
bureaucratic system during its heyday,178 but it was likely a necessary
step to bureaucratic maturity. Noted political scientist Francis
Fukuyama argues that what Americans commonly refer to as a spoils
system is, in fact, “clientelism,” whereby politicians award jobs and
other benefits to supporters on a large, well-organized scale.179
Clientelism occurs as a frequent step in democratic maturity as
politicians endeavor to command majority-voting blocks. Numerous
countries bear witness.180 Indeed, clientelism may be especially
democratic in the sense that the election of a president indicates the
public wants a change in the on-the-ground bureaucratic

174. See id. at 949–50 (“[F]or the first thirty years of the country’s history, with the exception
of Jefferson’s attempt to modify the political balance of the government work force, removals
were rare, and those made were for cause.”).
175. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582.
176. See Frug, supra note 23, at 950–51.
177. See id. at 951–52; see also Farkas v. Thornburgh, 493 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (“Although some historians trumpet Jackson’s pervasive endorsement and exploitation of
patronage, actually Jackson removed no more than one-tenth to one-fifth of the previously
appointed federal service.”).
178. See Farkas, 493 F. Supp. at 1170 n.8 (discussing nineteenth-century criticism of the
patronage system). An office seeker’s assassination of President Garfield created an impetus for
reforming civil service selection and enacting the Pendleton Act. See William R. Sherman, A
Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, 112 MICH. L. REV. 905, 914 (2014).
179. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 86 (2014).
180. See id. at 91–93 (noting that clientelism is a manner of mobilizing voters in early
democracies; that Taiwan and the United States have turned away from it; and that Italy, Japan,
and Greece still have forms of clientelism).
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administration.181 But what clientelism does to enrich democratic
accountability can undermine the bureaucracy’s ability to work in a
fair, impartial, and efficient way—just ask Greece and Italy.182
As the federal bureaucracy and national economy became more
complex after the Civil War, Congress enacted statutes to render the
bureaucracy more professional. In one of its first efforts,183 Congress
passed the Pendleton Act of 1883, creating a competitive examination
process for hiring civil servants.184 The Act, however, neither required
the president to hire based on the examination scores nor regulated the
president’s removal authority.185 Instead, it merely permitted the
president to use the Civil Service Commission to administer the
examination, as opposed to relying upon political-party bosses.186
Removal protections were thought unnecessary because the president
would have little incentive to remove if a merit system, not patronage,
governed new hires.187
Professor Gerald Frug has demonstrated that the executive, not
Congress, became the driving force behind the push to limit the
president’s removal authority during the bureaucracy’s expansion at
the turn of the twentieth century.188 The executive agency charged with
overseeing the civil service, the Civil Service Commission, had asked
President Cleveland to issue an executive order that would require a
removing official to provide the reason for removal and include it in
departmental records.189 Although Cleveland declined to do so,190

181. See CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 42 (1904); id. at 78
(“[W]hen the people voted in 1828 that John Quincy Adams should leave office, they
undoubtedly intended to vote that most of the civil servants should go with him.”).
182. See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 179, at 94–134 (describing how old forms of
clientelism in Italy and Greece led to the Italian and Grecian financial crises in the 2000s).
183. The Tenure of Office Act of 1867 was not aimed so much at improving the working of
the bureaucracy but as limiting the ability of President Johnson to remove officials without the
Senate’s approbation. See Frug, supra note 23, at 952–53.
184. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403.
185. See Frug, supra note 23, at 954–55.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 955. Professor Jennifer Mascott suggests that the Supreme Court has intimated
a similar, yet inverse, relationship in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988): the more control
that the executive has over appointment, the less control the executive needs over removal. See
Mascott, supra note 56, at 38–39.
188. See generally Frug, supra note 23, at 947–61 (describing the history of the civil service
and the presidential power to remove, especially how presidents would limit removal power
through executive orders).
189. See 15 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 19 (1899).
190. See Frug, supra note 23, at 956.
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President McKinley did. In fact, McKinley went even further, ordering
that “[n]o removal shall be made from any position subject to
competitive examination except for just cause and upon written
charges filed with the head of the department or other appointing
officer, and of which the accused shall have full notice and an
opportunity to make defense.”191 McKinley, accordingly, required “just
cause” for removal from the competitive civil service and provided, at
the very least, internal process for the employee at issue.
To assuage the Commission’s concern that fired officials could
obtain a trial over the reason for their removal under McKinley’s
order, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft clarified in
executive orders that notice and opportunity to be heard provided only
the right to reply to one’s agency superiors before removal.192
Roosevelt’s order also clarified that “just cause” for removal “was
intended to mean any cause, other than one merely political or
religious, which will promote the efficiency of the service.” Employees
had no right to judicial review of their superior’s absolute discretion to
determine when sufficient cause existed for removal.193
Starting around the time of the Roosevelt and Taft orders,
Congress took a series of uneven actions on the removal front. First, it
codified in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 the “efficiency of the
service” standard and the right of employees to respond to their agency
superiors found in the earlier presidential orders.194 Second, in the
Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, Congress extended additional rights
to veterans by allowing them to challenge their removal in an oral
hearing and to seek review from the Civil Service Commission.195
Third, in 1946 Congress created the office of ALJs (then called
“hearing examiners”) and limited ALJs’ removal “only for good cause
established and determined by the Civil Service Commission . . . after
opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof.”196 The

191. 14 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 24 (1898).
192. See Frug, supra note 23, at 956–58.
193. See id. at 957 (quoting 19 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 76 (1902)).
194. See id. at 958 (citing Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7102 (1970)). The relevant language permitted only removal with “such cause
as will promote the efficiency of [the civil] service,” and the statute granted only a right to written
reasons and a written opportunity to respond. § 6, 37 Stat. 555.
195. See Frug, supra note 23, at 959.
196. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, ch. 324, § 11, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946)
(“Examiners”).
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incongruity of review for different federal employees led to calls for a
uniform system.197
The executive, not Congress, initially responded. President
Kennedy established administrative appeals within each agency for
adverse employment actions and granted all employees a right to an
oral hearing. President Nixon went further. He granted nonveterans
the same right that veterans had to appeal to the Commission and later
abolished the Kennedy-era appeals within each agency.198 These
executive-led improvements culminated in the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978 (“CRA”),199 which Congress enacted largely to restore
eroded trust in the federal government after Watergate.200 Among
numerous other things, the CRA abolished the Commission and
created two agencies to assume its functions: OPM would largely
oversee hiring and personnel management, while the MSPB would,
among other things, review agency-imposed removals and discipline.201
In summary, the story of insulating executive officials from at-will
removal is largely one of executive invention and impetus, followed by
eventual congressional codification of many of the executive-imposed
personnel measures.
III. IMPARTIALITY REGULATIONS
Internal separation of powers is extremely beneficial to agency
adjudicators. Justice Breyer recognized in his Free Enterprise Fund
dissent that “sometimes it is necessary to disable oneself . . . to achieve
a broader objective. . . . If the President seeks to regulate through
impartial adjudication, then insulation of the adjudicator from removal
at will can help him achieve that goal.”202 A subordinate decisionmaker’s “neutrality might inspire confidence,” according to Professor
Katyal, “both in the public eye and in the courts, in a way that political
decisions could not.”203 Internal administrative law for adjudication—
197. See Frug, supra note 23, at 960.
198. See id. at 961.
199. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
200. See Julie Jones, Give A Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad Interpretation of the
Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1141
(2003).
201. See Earl Sanders, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d): The Civil Service Commission Did Not Fade
Away—Entirely, 31 HOW. L.J. 197, 199 (1988); About, U.S. MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD,
https://www.mspb.gov/About/about.htm [https://perma.cc/AA3D-DYHY].
202. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 522 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203. Katyal, supra note 143, at 2335.
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via regulation and executive order, or collectively, “impartiality
regulations”—can achieve these purposes without offending the
constitutional separation of powers. Indeed, Professor Daniel
Rodriguez advocates for leaving matters of bias to agencies to regulate
themselves, given the difficulty of having courts fashion doctrine to
address various forms of bureaucratic bias, different kinds of decisionmakers, and disparate types of decisions.204 And Professor Jennifer
Nou similarly suggests that courts “are not well-placed to adjudicate
decisional independence claims [asserted by ALJs concerning agency
oversight or interference], which are at their root managerial questions
requiring political tradeoffs.”205 Impartiality regulations allow agencies
to address matters that are, in Nou’s words, “internal to [the] agenc[y]
and the executive branch,”206 while recognizing that these internal
matters can impact both private parties and public perception.
This Part proposes adopting impartiality regulations to govern
agency adjudicators of all stripes. Section A considers how the
executive branch can design and implement such impartiality
regulations. The regulations that establish and protect the Office of the
Special Counsel provide a useful template. But the impartiality
regulations would have to clarify to whom they apply specifically, and
they should be promulgated through notice-and-comment process to
establish as firm a commitment to impartiality as possible from the
executive branch. Section B then considers how the impartiality
regulations should address adjudicators’ discipline and removal, meritbased hiring, and other provisions that provide indicia of impartiality.
Section C concludes by considering potential concerns or skepticism
over impartiality regulations as a useful form of internal administrative
law.
A. Designing and Implementing Impartiality Regulations
In designing impartiality regulations, the executive branch need
not start from scratch. The Department of Justice already has
regulations that establish the office and independence of the special
counsel. These Special Counsel Regulations (“SCRs”) provide a

204. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Bias in Regulatory Administration, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 76), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3430809 [https://perma.cc/RY4U-H24T].
205. Jennifer Nou, Dismissing Decisional Independence Suits, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1187, 1189
(2019).
206. Id.
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template for adjudicatory impartiality regulations, although the
impartiality regulations should depart from some of the SCRs’
particulars. With a template in hand, the executive branch should next
grapple with how to identify the adjudicators to whom the impartiality
regulations would apply. Finally, before diving into the substance of
the impartiality regulations, the executive drafters should consider the
appropriate process and form for implementing their impartiality
regulations.
1. The Special Counsel Regulations as a Template. In brief, the
SCRs concern the grounds for appointing a special counsel, his or her
qualifications, jurisdiction, staffing, powers, reporting requirements,
and removal from office.207 As most relevant to adjudicator
impartiality, the regulations provide that the attorney general can
remove the special counsel “for misconduct, dereliction of duty,
incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including
violation of Departmental policies.”208 These regulations have
governed the appointments of special counsels John Danforth when
reviewing the FBI’s conduct in the Waco, Texas, siege and, most
recently, Robert Mueller when investigating Russian interference in
the 2016 presidential election.209
The SCRs filled a void when Congress declined to revive the
Office of the Independent Counsel following expiration of the Ethics
in Government Act. That Act was widely criticized for bestowing too
much power on the independent counsel.210 And although the Supreme
Court held the Office of the Independent Counsel is constitutional in
Morrison v. Olson,211 several legal scholars have found Justice Scalia’s
lone dissent—raising various constitutional separation-of-powers
issues—to be both prescient and convincing.212 Katyal sought to avoid
repeating the mistakes of the past when he drafted the SCRs during
the Clinton administration, noting that they cabin the special counsel’s

207.
208.
209.

See generally General Powers of Special Counsel, 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.10 (2019).
Id. § 600.7(d).
See CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857, SPECIAL
COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 8–9 (2019)
(discussing past special counsel investigations). The appointment of Patrick Fitzgerald to
investigate the leaking of a CIA operative’s identity did not occur under the regulations. See id.
at 9.
210. See id. at 8.
211. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
212. See id. at 24–25.
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investigatory discretion but still removed the special prosecutors from
“the day-to-day control and influence of political actors.”213
The impartiality regulations can serve a similar purpose as the
SCRs. Both are internal devices that the executive branch can use to
preserve useful schemes in the face of legislative silence, constitutional
question, and pragmatic concern. Both separate a small subset of
executive officials with sensitive duties from “day-to-day supervision
of any official of the [agency]”214 while permitting executive superiors
to retain final policymaking authority. The SCRs promote nonpolitical
investigations of sensitive matters or conflicted executive actors, and
the impartiality regulations provide the appearance of an impartial
forum and thereby impart legitimacy to executive decision-making.
2. Defining “Adjudicators.” The regulations would need to first
identify the covered adjudicators. Including ALJs is easy because their
uniform, statutory-based status makes them easy to identify.215 NonALJ adjudicators, however, prove more difficult to identify because of
their disparate titles and diverse roles. Nevertheless, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”)—the
independent agency charged with providing research and
recommendations to federal agencies and Congress—has provided two
workable definitions.
First, non-ALJ adjudicators could be those who preside over what
Professor Michael Asimow terms “Type B”—as opposed to “Type
A”—adjudications. Type A adjudications include only those that are
“required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing.”216 In other words, Type A hearings are those
over which ALJs preside and which are governed by §§ 554, 556, and
557 of the APA.217 Type B hearings, in contrast, concern “agency
adjudication that employ evidentiary hearings required by statutes,

213. Katyal, supra note 143, at 2338.
214. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(b) (2019).
215. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 3105 (2018) (provisions that expressly consider
“administrative law judges”).
216. Michael Asimow, Best Practices for Evidentiary Hearings Outside the Administrative
Procedure Act, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 937 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 5. U.S.C.
§ 554(a)).
217. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (providing the “on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing” trigger for Type A adjudication).
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regulations, or executive orders, but are not governed by the formal
adjudication provisions of the APA.”218
Second, non-ALJ adjudicators could fall within a broader
definition to include those who are not ALJs or members of the agency,
but nonetheless preside over hearings in which parties may opt for an
oral, evidentiary hearing under statute, regulation, or other law. 219 This
broader definition would capture elected—but not mandatory—
adjudications and executive officials who may only rarely oversee
evidentiary hearings, such as patent examiners. By excluding members
of the agency, such as agency heads and commissioners, the
impartiality regulations maintain the traditional and APA-based
distinction between lower-level adjudicators and agency heads.
3. Implementing Impartiality Regulations. To implement the
impartiality regulations, the executive branch should take a two-prong
approach. Justice Kagan noted that “the President has the ability to
effect comprehensive, coherent change in administrative
policymaking.”220 To that end, the president should issue executive
orders to all agencies, including independent agencies, at those
independent agencies’ election. The order would provide a template
set of notice-and-comment regulations for agencies to promulgate for
those agency adjudicators who fall within the order’s ambit, but it
would provide discretion to individual agencies to account for any
necessary revisions for a particular adjudicatory scheme or enabling
act. The executive order should ensure that the impartiality regulations
permeate the administrative state and apply to both ALJs and nonALJ adjudicators. The promulgation of rules pursuant to executive
order for each agency can find statutory basis in the APA221 and
traditional notions of administrative common law.222
Agencies should agree to use notice-and-comment procedures
under 5 U.S.C. § 553 for any rulemaking—whether promulgation,

218. Asimow, supra note 216, at 925.
219. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 25 (providing a more detailed definition).
220. Kagan, supra note 152, at 2341.
221. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (“Each agency is granted the authority necessary to comply with the
requirements of this subchapter through the issuance of rules or otherwise.”).
222. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524–
25 (1978) (establishing that courts cannot generally impose additional procedure beyond a
statute’s requirements on agency decision-making); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 8.02, at 519 (1958) (noting that the APA promoted uniformity only as to
minimal requirements).
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amendment, or repeal223—concerning impartiality regulations. It is
true that agency management and personnel matters are excluded from
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements under § 553.224
Generally, the process is less useful for matters that are merely internal
to the agency and thus do “not affect . . . the public.”225 But agencies
can and often do elect to use notice-and-comment process, even if the
matter at issue falls under an exemption.226
For impartiality regulations, the notice-and-comment process is
beneficial in three ways. First, the process may prove useful because
regulated parties have a direct interest in the fairness of agency
proceedings. Second, the process, by engaging the public, is likely to
render the impartiality regulations more salient, which is useful for
matters related to the appearance of impartiality. Finally, the use of
notice and comment for any amendment or repeal would render any
change much more transparent, help create a more developed record
for judicial review, and establish a more meaningful—and potentially
longer-lasting—executive commitment. The agency should commit to
using notice and comment for any amendment or repeal to create as
much regulatory permanence as possible.
B. The Substance of the Impartiality Regulations
The impartiality regulations would depart from the SCRs in their
particulars. They would not focus on authority and notifications.
Instead, the impartiality regulations would focus on three key areas:
discipline and removal, merit-based appointment, and additional
indicia of separation from the agency.
1. Discipline-and-Removal Provisions. To resolve any due process
concern over adjudicators’ protection from at-will discipline or
removal, the regulations should duplicate ALJs’ current statutory
223. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defining “rule making” to include the formulation, amendment, or
repeal of a “rule”).
224. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). The SCRs were not promulgated with notice and comment. BROWN
& COLE, supra note 209, at 20 (citing Office of Special Counsel, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038, 37,041 (July
9, 1999)).
225. TOM C. CLARK, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 18 (1947).
226. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 170, § 7.10, at 669 (noting that agencies have voluntarily
adopted notice-and-comment rulemaking, despite statutory exemptions); see also Public
Participation in Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 13804 (July 24, 1971) (discussing the advantages of
implementing the recommendation of the ACUS to require notice and comment, even when
exempted by statute).
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protection from at-will adverse action for all agency adjudicators227 as
follows:
An agency may not take a covered action, as defined herein, against
an adjudicator unless the Merit Systems Protection Board determines
that good cause exists on the record after opportunity for a hearing
before the Board.

The “covered actions” could simply duplicate those listed as
applying to ALJs, such as removals, suspensions, and reductions in
pay.228 Notably, this regulation does not alter current protections for
the entire civil service, but it does ensure that all lower-level
adjudicators—not just ALJs—receive sufficient administrative process
before an independent agency disciplines or removes them. It also
provides all covered agency adjudicators with the same level of
protection by granting the non-ALJs the more robust form of
protection that ALJs currently enjoy.229 Adjudicators’ shared function
and need for impartiality justify uniform removal protection.230
The impartiality regulations go further than the SCRs by giving
agency adjudicators, unlike the special counsel, a right to a formal
administrative hearing and judicial review. Echoing earlier civil service
regulations, the SCRs attempt to prevent all review by stating that the
regulations do not create any rights that could be subject to judicial
review.231 The impartiality regulations would not do so. Instead, they
would seek to demonstrate a strong commitment from the executive
branch for impartial adjudicators by permitting administrative and
judicial review. This commitment exists because the president or
227. 5 U.S.C. § 7521.
228. Id. § 7521(b).
229. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
230. Many, if not most, non-ALJ adjudicators are hired for a probationary period. See 5
C.F.R. § 315.801 (2019) (OPM regulation: “Probationary period; when required”). Unless a
statute requires otherwise for particular non-ALJs, the regulation should not subject them to
probationary periods because of the control that it gives the agency over the adjudicator’s
livelihood.
231. 28 C.F.R. § 600.10 (2019) (“No creation of rights. The regulations in this part are not
intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or equity, by any person or entity, in any matter, civil, criminal, or
administrative.”). The courts “have generally not . . . recognized [the SCRs] as creating judicially
enforceable rights.” BROWN & COLE, supra note 209, at 20. The Office of Management and
Budget included a similar no-rights provision in its “Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance
Practices,” which established policies for developing guidance documents through executive
agencies. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 149, at 1288 (referring to OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO. 07-02, FINAL BULLETIN FOR
AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3437, 3440 (Jan. 25, 2007)).
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agency cannot, consistent with United States v. Nixon,232 simply ignore
the regulations by disciplining adjudicators at will or without review as
long as the regulations are in effect. Unlike special counsels, who have
high political salience, agency adjudicators do not have significant
public visibility and potential political protection from interference.
The regulatory protection and right to seek review protect the more
vulnerable adjudicators.
Neither administrative nor judicial review requires any
congressional action. The MSPB has broad jurisdiction to adjudicate
matters referred to it by regulation or rule.233 All orders from the
MSPB, in turn, are subject to deferential judicial review.234
Notably, impartiality regulations resolve the agency-adjudicator
dilemma. They provide a prophylactic device—limiting at-will
discipline or removal—for protecting impartiality. Indeed, the
presence or lack of at-will removal is the device for presidential control
that the Court has featured in its Article II jurisprudence. At the same
time, because the executive branch imposes the protection from at-will
removal from within, it does not implicate Free Enterprise Fund’s
prohibition or any other form of impermissible congressional
limitation on presidential supervision.
By permitting the MSPB to establish when cause exists, the
impartiality regulations render it unnecessary to consider the
Department of Justice’s current view that could render good-cause
removal toothless. As part of his briefing in Lucia and subsequent
cases, Solicitor General Noel Francisco asserted that the tiered
protection from at-will removal for ALJs is constitutional as long as
“good cause” permits removal for any “ALJ who fails to perform
adequately or to follow agency policies, procedures, or instructions. . .
. An ALJ cannot, however, be removed for any invidious reason or to
influence the outcome in a particular adjudication.”235 Francisco
232. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
233. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1) (“The [MSPB] shall hear, adjudicate, or provide for the hearing or
adjudication, of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Board under . . . any . . . rule, or
regulation . . . .”). Nothing in the regulation distinguishes between the MSPB’s appellate and
original jurisdiction. Based on my research, the most common and long-standing way that the
MSPB obtains jurisdiction via rule is through OPM regulations. See, e.g., Cowan v. United States,
710 F.2d 803, 805 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
234. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1), (c).
235. SG Mem., supra note 101, at 9; see also Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at
50, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130), 2018 WL 1251862, at *50. But does the
solicitor general’s interpretation mean that the agency could use removal to influence outcomes
in more than one proceeding?
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continued that the “MSPB review [must be] suitably deferential to the
determination of the Department Head.”236 In short, the solicitor
general’s view treats the ALJs as if their protections mirrored those for
the civil service, where the MSPB merely defers to the agency’s
determination of cause, despite the statutory language requiring the
MSPB to decide whether good cause exists in the first instance.237
Because the recommended impartiality regulations would treat all
adjudicators like ALJs for removal purposes—the opposite of the
solicitor general’s proposed view—it is not necessary for the
regulations to define “good cause.” The MSPB’s decisional law would
continue to define the phrase. Moreover, with the MSPB determining
whether cause exists, the impartiality regulations avoid the problem of
allowing agencies to remove adjudicators based on inappropriate
reasons under cover of vague criteria like “inadequate performance.”
Finally, by replicating ALJs’ protection from at-will removal for
all adjudicators, the impartiality regulations prevent an administration
from neutering the MSPB to render the removal protections
ineffective. For much of the Trump administration, the MSPB has not
been able to issue final orders because it has lacked either a quorum or
all three members.238 The inability of the MSPB to function empowers
employing agencies by fully limiting regular federal civil servants to
appeal adverse actions.239 Given the Trump administration’s professed
hostility to civil service protections, the MSPB’s failure to have a
quorum may be one strategy to ensure that civil service law goes
unenforced.240 But the same dynamic does not hold true for ALJs and,
as proposed, for non-ALJ adjudicators. Agencies cannot act against
adjudicators until the MSPB permits it to do so. By requiring the MSPB
236. SG Mem., supra note 101, at 9.
237. See supra note 88.
238. See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board: Frequently Asked Questions about the Lack of
Board Quorum and Lack of Board Members, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD (Mar. 1,
2019), https://www.mspb.gov/FAQs_Absence_of_Board_Quorum_March_1_2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y8TZ-CJZS] (discussing the functioning of the MSPB in light of its lack of a quorum).
239. See Adam Mazmanian, Senate Panel Advances Third MSPB Nominee, FCW (June 20,
2019), https://fcw.com/articles/2019/06/20/mspb-senate-quorum-mazmanian.aspx [https://perma.
cc/UAN8-XHQ8] (noting that MSPB has a “backlog of more than 2,000 appeals”); Nicole
Ogrysko, MSPB Has Never Been Without a Quorum for This Long, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan.
12, 2018), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce-rightsgovernance/2018/01/mspb-has-neverbeen-without-a-quorum-for-this-long [https://perma.cc/523B-AP9J] (noting that civil servants
cannot get backpay or reinstatement when the MSPB lacks a quorum).
240. See Ogrysko, supra note 239 (quoting federal employment attorney Debra D’Gostino as
saying, “[t]he board is all about enforcement of the Civil Service Reform Act, and I just can’t see
where this administration [is] interested in that act being enforced”).
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to act before adverse action, the impartiality regulations better protect
adjudicator impartiality.
2. Merit-Based Appointment.
Promulgating the removal
provisions for the impartiality regulations addresses the agencyadjudicator dilemma. Yet, as recent executive practice indicates, the
regulations can be much more comprehensive. They can also consider
merit-based hiring and various indicia of separation of functions—all
of which relate to impartiality. The recent executive order concerning
ALJ hiring provides a starting point. Although the executive order
listed only one minimal requirement for ALJ hiring—concerning bar
licensure241—agencies have already set up thoughtful processes to
consider germane skills and attributes for impartial ALJs.242
The impartiality regulations could go further by expressly
requiring merit-based hiring for all agency adjudicators, subject to
agencies’ discretion to identify the relevant qualifications for their
particular adjudicators. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal,243 the
Supreme Court required an elected state supreme court justice to
recuse himself under the Due Process Clause when one party to an
appeal had a “significant and disproportionate influence in placing the
judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election
campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”244 The problem
was that the donor-party, even if indirectly, “ch[ose] the judge in his
own case.”245
Agencies, in comparison, are frequently parties to agency
adjudication,246 and they can often directly select their adjudicators.
Recall that while agencies had long hired their ALJs under an OPMled merit-selection process that limited agency discretion to hire
whomever the agency preferred, a recent executive order has removed

241. Exec. Order 13843 § 3 (July 10, 2018). The executive order did, however, list criteria that
said ALJs “must display[:] appropriate temperament, legal acumen, impartiality, and sound
judgment. They must also clearly communicate their decisions to the parties who appear before
them, the agencies that oversee them, and the public that entrusts them with authority.” Id. § 1.
242. See JACK M. BEERMANN & JENNIFER L. MASCOTT, RESEARCH REPORT ON FEDERAL
AGENCY ALJ HIRING AFTER LUCIA AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 13843, at 30–45 (2019) (discussing
interview-based findings of ALJ-hiring processes in numerous agencies, including DOL, HHS,
NLRB, EPA, and FERC).
243. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Co., 556 U.S. 868, 870 (2009).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 425, 446–50 (2019) (discussing types of agency adjudication).
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ALJs from the competitive service. Agencies may now directly hire
ALJs without going through OPM’s competitive ALJ-hiring process.247
Likewise, agencies can often appoint their non-ALJ adjudicators from
already-hired agency officials.248 By requiring merit-based hiring and
mandating that agencies consider the relevant criteria for hiring on the
front end, agencies will have less ability to engage in partisan hiring,
even if indirectly or sub rosa.
The concern over partisan-based hiring is not speculative. In 2018,
The Washington Post reported that the White House rejected
candidates for administrative judges on the Board of Veterans’
Appeals (“BVA”) based on the candidates’ political orientation. The
president, who has statutory authority to approve the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs’ appointments,249 required the candidates to list their
political affiliations. The White House rejected the candidates
affiliated with the Democratic Party and hired those affiliated with the
Republican Party and one without a party affiliation who had voted in
Republican primaries. Despite the fact that the Democratic-affiliated
candidates were acting judges at the BVA and recommended by the
Board’s chairperson—an official whom President Trump appointed—
the agency reopened the position to fill the remaining vacancies.250 In
the George W. Bush administration, the Department of Justice
similarly engaged in partisan-based hiring of immigration judges and
members of the Board of Immigration Appeals.251 Similar concerns
over partisan hiring for immigration judges continue today.252
Just as the recent executive order has given agencies more
discretion in ALJ hiring, the impartiality regulations could ensure that
agencies use merit-based hiring for adjudicators. The impartiality
regulations would not readopt the OPM’s former merit-based hiring

247. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
248. Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 59–60, 60 fig.20.
249. 38 U.S.C. § 7101A(a)(1) (2018).
250. Lisa Rein, “I’ve Never Seen These Positions Politicized”: White House Rejection of
Veterans Judges Raises Concerns of Partisanship, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018, 10:32 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ive-never-seen-these-positions-politicized-white-house
-rejection-of-veterans-judges-raises-concerns-of-partisanship/2018/10/23/f488046a-ce51-11e8-920
f-dd52e1ae4570_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5cbf107b2c46 [https://perma.cc/7VMTKB6W].
251. See Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 14–15
(2018) (describing the Department of Justice’s inquiry into the partisan hiring of immigration
judges during the George W. Bush administration).
252. Id. at 29 (describing concerns over the independence of immigration judges during the
Trump administration).
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process for ALJs wholesale. To be sure, OPM, together with its
predecessor, the Civil Service Commission, has more than a century of
experience in merit-based hiring. But its ALJ-hiring process was widely
criticized as too time-consuming and poorly designed.253 To work
toward better merit-based hiring for neutral adjudicators specifically,
the executive order and regulations could simply state as follows:
All adjudicators shall be selected, whether from outside or from
within the agency, under a merit-based process. The agency shall
consult the Office of Personnel Management and consider any
recommendations from the Administrative Conference of the United
States when establishing and revising the merit-based selection
process for adjudicators.

This consultation-based approach permits agencies to have more
control over the speed and overall design of the hiring process while
promoting appropriate merit-hiring principles. Agencies have
preferred various subject-matter and litigation-based expertise in ALJ
hiring,254 and at least two agencies have sought to hire only those who
have never worked at the agency to mitigate the appearance of proagency bias.255 Merit-based hiring helps ensure that the agency, despite
directly choosing the judges in their own cases (as the Appointments
Clause may require), considers only factors that are germane to the
judge’s ability to adjudicate fairly, efficiently, and competently.
Ultimately, adjudicator hiring must not permit the return of a
patronage system. Whatever ills patronage-based hiring has for the
civil service in general, its dangers are most apparent for officials who
are required to apply agency policy and statutory law neutrally, without
favor to those who may or may not have supported the hiring
administration and its policy goals.
3. Additional Provisions. ALJ hearings provide additional indicia
of impartiality that are often absent in non-ALJ hearings. For instance,
ALJs cannot have ex parte contacts with anyone about facts at issue
and only certain, limited ex parte contacts regarding legal issues under
253. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2004);
Nicole Schultheis, Executive Order Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive
Service, RESUME PLACE (July 12, 2018), https://www.resume-place.com/2018/07/alj-exceptedfrom-competitive-service [https://perma.cc/7HLQ-SZLZ].
254. See, e.g., BEERMANN & MASCOTT, supra note 242, at 30–45 (discussing the agencies’
various qualifications, including subject-matter expertise and litigation experience).
255. See id. at 43, 44 (discussing the EPA and Federal Labor Relations Authority).
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the APA.256 Relatedly, they cannot prosecute or investigate for the
agency or report to anyone who does.257 They also cannot receive
performance reviews or bonuses from their agencies.258 Some non-ALJ
adjudicators have all or some of these prohibitions, but some do not.259
The impartiality regulations could easily address these indicia in a way
that promotes impartiality but also, like the provision on merit-based
hiring, respects differences among agency adjudications.
Ex Parte Contacts. The impartiality regulations could contain a
prohibition on ex parte contacts with agency adjudicators. Federal
courts have recognized that ex parte communications can create due
process problems by undermining the fairness of the proceedings.260
The APA has a complicated set of ex parte prohibitions that
distinguishes between the kinds of communications, the identity of the
decision-maker, and the nature of the agency proceeding.261 But the
impartiality regulation can take a simpler approach for both ALJs and
non-ALJ adjudicators—the one that ACUS’s Model Adjudication
Rules (“MARs”) has proposed for more than twenty-five years in its
MAR 120:
Except as required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized
by law, the Adjudicator may not consult a person or party on any
matter relevant to the merits of the adjudication, unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate. This provision does not,

256. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(1), 557(d) (2018) (prohibiting certain ex parte communications).
257. See id. § 554(d)(2) (prohibiting supervision by investigative or prosecutorial agency
officials); id. § 3105 (“[ALJs] . . . may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and
responsibilities as administrative law judges.”).
258. Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1655–56.
259. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 61–66, 67–70, 73–83 (presenting survey data on
the nature of limitations, if any, on non-ALJ adjudicators’ ex parte communications). In my
earlier study, my co-author and I reported that 14 percent of the identified types of non-ALJs
who responded to the survey had no ex parte prohibitions. See id. at 68 fig.25.
260. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed.
Maritime Comm’n, 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The inconsistency of secret Ex parte
contacts with the notion of a fair hearing and with the principles of fairness implicit in due process
has long been recognized.”); Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co., 454 A.2d 435, 441–43 (N.H. 1982) (holding
that even in the absence of procedures by the legislature, due process requires state commission
members to refrain from ex parte communications when they act in an adjudicative capacity).
261. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1)–(2) (prohibiting ex parte communications concerning facts with
anyone and limiting certain investigating or prosecuting employees from advising ALJs); id.
§ 557(d) (prohibiting ex parte communications concerning the merits of the proceeding with those
outside of the agency).
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however, preclude the Adjudicator from consulting with adjudicatory
employees such as law clerks.262

Agencies could turn to MAR 120 and its additional provisions—
which govern agency heads, the timing of the prohibition, and
remediation for violations—for additional considerations and
guidance. Although many non-ALJ adjudicators are already subject to
the standard provided in MAR 120,263 a recent survey indicated that
approximately 14 percent of the reported non-ALJ types—that is,
identifiable groups of non-ALJs within an agency—have no limitations
whatsoever on ex parte communications.264
Separation of Functions and Bonus Eligibility. Relatedly, the
impartiality regulations could require separation of functions for all
adjudicators, meaning that adjudicators can only adjudicate, not
perform other agency functions. Agencies recently indicated that
about 43 percent of reported non-ALJ-adjudicator types have no
separation of functions, and about one-third of those types that preside
over hearings in which an agency is a party also lack separation.265
MAR 121 calls for the same separation of functions that applies to
ALJs to govern all agency adjudicators.266 The official comments to
MAR 121 note that the APA excludes certain agency adjudications
from the prohibition: those addressing initial licensing and those
concerning rates, facilities, or practices related to public carriers or
utilities.267
The separation of functions is especially important for non-ALJ
adjudicators because, unlike ALJs, they are almost always subject to
performance reviews268 and may receive performance bonuses from

262. ADMIN. CONF. U.S., MODEL ADJUDICATION RULE 120 (2018) [hereinafter MAR],
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Model%20Adjudication%20Rules%209.13.1
8%20ACUS_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4HE-P7GR ].
263. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 68 (discussing the nature of ex parte limitations
for non-ALJ adjudicators).
264. Id. at 68 fig.25.
265. Id. at 61.
266. Compare MAR, supra note 262, at R. 121 (proposing that those doing investigative or
prosecutorial work for the agency may not have any connection to adjudications or supervise the
adjudicator), with 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (prohibiting employees from being supervised by someone in
an investigative or prosecutorial role).
267. MAR, supra note 262, at R. 121 cmt. 2.
268. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 73 (noting that 99 percent of all 10,831 reported
non-ALJ adjudicators were subject to performance appraisals).
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their agencies.269 The Supreme Court, although it has indicated that
combined functions alone do not offend due process,270 has also
repeatedly looked askance at adjudicators having a financial interest in
the litigation before them.271 An agency-party paying its adjudicators
bonuses may not create a direct interest in the outcome of the
litigation, but doing so can indirectly, yet meaningfully, influence an
adjudicator if she thinks that the agency will be more generous when
she favors the agency. Similarly, impartiality regulations could
delineate the appropriate considerations in reviewing non-ALJ
adjudicators and in awarding non-ALJ adjudicators bonuses to
mitigate any appearance of partiality.
Other matters may also be suitable for the impartiality
regulations. For instance, ACUS has recommended that agencies
adopt recusal processes and standards for agency adjudicators.272
Likewise, creating physical separation between agency adjudicators
and the rest of the agency may be a meaningful way of maintaining
psychological separation.273 The larger point is that impartiality
regulations can address not only a constitutional dilemma of the
Supreme Court’s making but also other matters related to adjudicatory
impartiality and fairness.
C. Potential Concerns
Impartiality regulations have drawbacks. They require resources,
limit the responsibility that Congress and courts have in assuring that
agency adjudication has legitimacy, and depend upon political will and
long-sighted vision for good government. Each concern is addressed in
turn below.

269. See id. at 77–78 (noting that 90 percent of all non-ALJ adjudicators are eligible for pay
bonuses).
270. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54 n.20 (1975) (noting that the agency’s internal
separation of functions was not necessary to its holding that the particular sequence of functions
at issue was constitutional).
271. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1982); Ward v. Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520, 535 (1927).
272. Admin. Conf. U.S., Adoption of Recommendations, 84 Fed. Reg. 2139, 2139–41 (Feb. 6,
2019) (describing Recommendation 2018-4).
273. See Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1495–96 (2018) (discussing the use of physical separation in Canada
to further separation of powers); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 787 (1976) (considering the utility of separated physical space to
encourage separation of adjudicators from others in the agency). For findings on the status of
physical separation for non-ALJs, see Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 70–71.
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1. The Costs of Regulating Impartiality. Impartiality regulations,
of course, have costs. The entire executive branch will need to invest
time in drafting and circulating the executive order and promulgating
the regulations. Aside from promulgation itself, impartiality has its
own costs. Merit-based hiring is more demanding than discretionary
hiring because it limits the pool of suitable candidates and requires
some evaluation of the candidates’ merit. The protection from at-will
removal will render the removal of poorly performing adjudicators
more onerous because of the required administrative process.
Additional impartiality provisions may, in certain adjudications, slow
down the hearing process by limiting ex parte contacts or limiting to
whom the agency may assign adjudicatory roles.
Yet these costs are not as onerous as they may first appear. For
instance, the promulgation costs are largely a one-time expenditure.
Once drafted, any revisions to the order or regulations are likely to
prove rare and be limited to only a handful of agencies because they
address fundamental, structural matters related to adjudication, not
fact-bound technical issues.
The protections from at-will discipline or removal only slightly
alter the status quo. For ALJs, nothing changes. For non-ALJ
adjudicators, the only change is that now the MSPB makes the initial
determination as to whether good cause exists. Notably, these changes
do not alter the entire civil service—merely a small portion of it.
Depending on how the order and regulations define their covered
adjudicators, at most they could cover around ten thousand of the 2.1
million federal employees,274 or less than one-half of a percent.
Likewise, merit-based hiring is already required for the civil service—
despite room for improvement275—and agencies are already in the
process of creating merit-based hiring processes.276
The additional hearing-related costs, such as ex parte prohibitions,
will prove a more significant change to agency adjudication over the
long term. But when weighing these benefits, two iterations of working
groups that drafted ACUS’s MARs—comprised of scholars, agency
officials, and agency adjudicators—have included the provisions

274.

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43590, FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM
1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43590.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV3N-SJF5].
275. See generally Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 85–89 (suggesting improvements to
non-ALJ hiring).
276. See generally BEERMANN & MASCOTT, supra note 242, at 30–45 (discussing current ALJhiring processes).
AND OMB
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mentioned here. In fact, ACUS itself has recommended that agencies
implement many of these protections proposed here to promote
impartiality,277 and many agencies have adopted certain protections.278
In short, I would be far from the first to find that the benefits of
provisions that improve the appearance of impartiality outweigh the
costs.
2. Shirking Congressional and Judicial Responsibility. One may be
concerned that promulgating impartiality regulations lets courts and
Congress off the hook by, respectively, giving them cover from the
policy concerns of invalidating statutory provisions or failing to act to
improve agency adjudication writ large. They may well do so. The
impartiality regulations, to be clear, are a second-best response to my
preferred outcome for the Court to bless the tiered protections from
removal and for Congress to improve all adjudicators’ appearance of
impartiality. Because recent doctrinal shifts indicate that the Court is
unlikely to adopt a functional approach to the president’s removal
power that accounts for due process concerns,279 the courts are unlikely
to provide a solution. Likewise, Congress has proven fairly
uninterested or ineffective in proactively protecting adjudicators.
These branches’ failure to act leaves the executive as the last, best
option to protect adjudicatory impartiality.
But absent my preferred course, impartiality regulations can
mitigate or moot judicial harm and serve as a replacement for
congressional inaction. First, the impartiality regulations limit the
ramifications of applying Free Enterprise Fund to adjudicators because
the regulations, by replicating the statutory status quo, serve as a
backstop. In fact, if agencies acted quickly to promulgate them before
current judicial proceedings end, the regulations may moot any
challenge because the Court’s judgment would not lead to a remedy
that changes anything. The adjudicators would have the same or more
protection from at-will removal even absent the current statutory
regime. Second, the regulations also help create a better system for
non-ALJ adjudicators, who significantly outnumber ALJs, even if
Congress fails to act or cannot act after a party’s successful judicial
277. ADMIN. CONF. U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2016-4, at 1, 3–4 (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/informal-agency-adjudication-recommendation
-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D49F-F7E5].
278. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 60–84 (discussing the impartiality protections
that agencies reported for non-ALJ adjudicators).
279. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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challenge based on Free Enterprise Fund. If Congress fails to or cannot
address the issue, the regulations simply have the executive branch to
do what it has historically done—regulate its own workforce.
An executive response does permit the other branches to avoid
responsibility for a problem of their own making. But the executive has
its own responsibility. It, no less than the other branches, should share
the political accountability in creating and maintaining a legitimate
bureaucracy. After all, as the executive’s history of protecting the civil
service indicates, the executive has the necessary tools to improve the
federal bureaucracy. If the executive refrained from acting out of fear
of shouldering the other branches’ responsibilities, the executive would
eschew its own duty.
3. The Necessity of Political Will. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly in the near term, will the executive branch have any
appetite for impartiality regulations? The inertia of and largely
unlimited agency discretion under the current system may lead the
executive branch to resist change. Given the Trump administration’s
views on removing ALJs as presented in Lucia and its aftermath,
change would likely have to await an election, whether for a more
receptive administration or as a lame-duck measure by an
administration on its way out the door that is hostile to the incoming
administration. But even new administrations of either major political
party might see an advantage in being able to control adjudicators in
matters that are important to them. For instance, conservatives may
prefer to control immigration judges, while progressives may prefer to
control adjudicators who preside over business-related enforcement
proceedings. Or administrations of one political party may seek to
establish impartial adjudicators only to have the administrations of the
other political party undo the impartiality regulations to benefit its
objectives. In other words, the “virtuous” party would lose policy
battles to the “nonvirtuous” party—an untenable political position.
All of these concerns highlight an underlying imperative of my
proposal: administrations of both major political parties must
appreciate the long-term benefits that impartiality provides, and they
must allow those benefits to outweigh their short-term partisan
interests. Of course, impartiality can hinder an administration’s shortterm policy goals. But unfettered control comes at a cost if meta policy
goals are mistaken for policy applications in the course of an
adjudication. For adjudications to have moral force they must apply,
and at times develop, policies in a fair and evenhanded way. That moral
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force benefits everyone involved in adjudication by treating affected
parties fairly, thus lending legitimacy to the process that, over time, can
develop an agency’s policy preferences. My hope is that this Article,
past ACUS recommendations and MARs, and increased scholarly
attention to adjudication will help provide the catalyst for agencies,
policymakers, and regulated entities to focus on and articulate these
benefits as part of improving agency adjudication.
If the executive branch has concerns over ceding significant
control to impartial adjudicators, those fears are misplaced.280 Agencies
have numerous basic, well-known tools for controlling policy and the
legal principles that guide even impartial adjudicators: interpretive
rules, substantive rules, policy statements, procedural rules, and
influence on congressional statutory drafting. Indeed, these
mechanisms provide more effective policy control because they apply
to all relevant cases. The agency need not monitor individual
adjudicators. And at any rate, brute policy implementation is not the
only value that executive action should consider. Reasoned, openminded decision-making, protection of regulated parties’ dignity
interests, and decisions that inspire confidence in the public are all
important aspects of good governance.
If my confidence in grand notions of good government and longterm interests of different actors seems naïve, I leave with you one
reminder: The federal government encountered significant concerns
over the impartiality of agency adjudicators during the New Deal.281
Congress and President Truman responded by giving ALJs—the
agency adjudicators whom they expected to preside over nearly all
evidentiary hearings282—significant indicia of impartiality in the APA.
To be sure, the action was in the form of statutory law, not executive
action. But the APA provisions on impartiality came from the Franklin

280. Agencies do not always seek to control policy. For example, prior to the APA, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) gave its examiners near-total independence in certain
matters, at least until the ICC’s administrative appellate review: “No one in the Commission has
power to substitute his judgment for that of the examiner in the preparation of the proposed
report. If the examiner chooses to depart from all the precedents established by Commission
decisions, he is free to do so and no one can stop him.” 2 DAVIS, supra note 222, § 10.01, at 2
(quotations omitted). But for certain other matters, the ICC reviewed the examiner’s report
before its issuance. See id. (describing ICC review of reorganization orders).
281. See Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices
to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6–8, 44 (1997) (discussing concerns over hearing
examiners’ combination of functions and bias).
282. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 15 (citing APA legislative history and the
attorney general’s manual on the APA).
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D. Roosevelt administration’s recommendations.283 The broader point
is that our political system has recognized and addressed concerns over
agency adjudicators’ impartiality. And it can do so again.
CONCLUSION
The executive is not helpless to address the agency-adjudicator
dilemma. Congress does not have to be the one to sheathe the
Damocles Sword of at-will removal. The executive branch can find the
scabbard all by itself. In fact, the executive can demonstrate its own
power by voluntarily taking action, instead of demonstrating its
weakness by having one of the other branches do so over the
executive’s objection. As this Article has indicated, the executive had
long done so. This Article attempts to remind agencies that they have
the power by themselves to limit the fallout from the constitutional
competition between due process and Article II if the courts and
Congress will not or cannot do so.
Perhaps even more importantly, the history of executive action in
insulating certain officials demonstrates that the executive can act. The
political responsibility falls not just on Congress but on the executive
branch. The president cannot simply say that Congress or judicial
doctrine ties his hands. Insulating or not insulating adjudicators is a
political choice—a choice within the executive’s discretion.
From a broader perspective, internal administrative law for
adjudicatory independence brings needed and beneficial uniformity to
federal agency adjudication. Professor Emily Bremer has persuasively
argued that, contrary to the strong pull of uniformity for agency
rulemaking and judicial review of agency action, “the governing norm
in adjudication is exceptionalism.”284 Although exceptionalism may
permit useful tailoring and efficiency, it has significant transparency
costs and precludes the entrenchment and stability of norms across
agencies.285 Because of its binary quality and the need for prophylactic
action, impartiality is an especially suitable candidate for uniform
treatment. The impartiality regulations here nudge agencies toward
283. See Gifford, supra note 281, at 7 (describing the history leading up to the APA’s
codification). Echoing the importance of recognizing good governance, the House Report for the
APA expected “self-interest and due concern for the proper performance of public functions” to
lead agencies to hire well-qualified adjudicators. H. REP. NO. 1980 (1946), reprinted in APA LEG.
HISTORY, supra note 52, at 280.
284. Emily Bremer, The Exceptionalism Norm in Administrative Adjudication, 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 1351, 1410.
285. See id. at 1413–16.
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uniformity, while giving some space for agency tailoring where
necessary.286 The executive need not await a congressional or judicial
catalyst to provide useful uniformity, mitigate a constitutional
conundrum, or improve the public’s confidence in executive decisionmaking.

286. Kenneth Culp Davis argued more than sixty years ago that “[t]he goal should be
elimination of needless diversity, not the achievement of uniformity.” 1 DAVIS, supra note 222,
§ 8.02, at 520.

